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Abstract
In this thesis I provide Swedish evidence suggesting that homeownership affects 
left-right orientation, a dimension that structures politics to a large extent in this 
country. While homeownership is a largely omitted variable in studies on political 
views, the home one owns is the most important asset of many Swedes today. I 
thus  expect  it  to  affect  political  views  via  its  economic  value.  Using ordered 
logistic regression on survey data from 2012, I find that homeownership is indeed 
associated with a more rightist, or less leftist, political orientation. Drawing on the 
notion of egotropy,  i.e.  that  private  economic circumstances  influence political 
views, I unveil a price pattern which strengthens the causal theory: the association 
between  homeownership  and  a  rightist  orientation  is  stronger  in  areas  where 
house-prices are higher. I also find that homeownership accounts for some of the 
loosening up of the relationship between left-right orientation and class, as the 
relationship is driven by some otherwise leftist class groups, and, relatedly, that it 
is driven by people who preferred parties in opposition to the 2006-2014 right-
wing  government.  Moreover,  the  relationship  with  left-right  orientation  is 
reflected in certain issue preferences and in party preferences. 
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1 Introduction
This  thesis  concerns  the  relationship  between  homeownership  and  left-right 
orientation.  An on-going discussion among scholars concerns possible ways  in 
which changes in the rate of homeownership is causally related to welfare state 
policy changes and also to changes in the electorate.  At least  since the 1990s, 
homeownership  in  most  Western  European welfare states  has  increased,  while 
public spending on welfare state services and social security has decreased. Many 
studies suggest that these outcomes are (negatively)  correlated over this period 
among most, if not all, welfare states of the Western type (Castles, 1998; 2005; 
Kemeny,  2001;  2005a;  Malpass,  2007;  Stamsö,  2010;  Doling  &  Horsewood, 
2003; 2005; 2011; Conley & Gifford, 2006).  
But as some scholars recognize (Doling & Horsewood, 2003; cf. Jones et al, 
2007:130;  Dewilde  &  Raeymaeckers,  2008:807),  research  on  the  relationship 
between  aggregate  political  outcomes  and  the  housing  stock  is  based  on 
individual-level (or micro-level) mechanisms that are rarely studied in their own 
right. Instead, macro-level outcomes are based on speculations about the behavior 
of politicians and voters (cf. Rehm, 2009:855f): scholars hypothesize, but never 
show, that homeowners have systematically different political views on matters 
related to the welfare state. Specifically, they argue that homeownership entails 
political views which make one more amenable to rightist policies on issues such 
as redistribution and privatization. 
A recent study (Ansell, 2014) picks up on the lack of individual-level studies 
that relate political orientation to homeownership. It confirms these conjectures 
for the US, Britain, and Europe in general. Ansell draws on the understanding that 
a home is not only a consumption good but also an asset from which wealth can 
be  extracted.  Arguing  that  homeowners  will  demand  less  from  government 
policies  when  their  financial  situation  improves,  he  finds  that  house-price 
increases  cause  homeowners  to  hold  more  rightist  preferences.  In  turn,  price 
increases are associated with more rightist policies when right-wing parties are in 
office in countries with high rates of homeownership (above the sample median of 
62%).  Outside  Britain  and the  US,  however,  I  am not  aware  of  any country-
specific  studies that  explore differences  in political  orientation between home-
owners and tenants that allow for inference regarding the whole population.
For  Sweden,  casual  observations  suggest  that  the  negative  relationship 
between homeownership and social spending exists.1 But more importantly for the 
present purpose, aggregate quantities suggest that there is cause for an empirical 
exploration of the relationship between homeownership and political orientations: 
1Common welfare state measures suggest changes compatible with the macro-relationship between homeowner-
ship and welfare state spending. They include a decreased public spending as share of GDP (Statistics Sweden a)  
or as share of the population (Ankarloo, 2008), and tightened criteria to qualify for social security payments  
(Blomqvist, 2008). These aggregate outcomes or changes will remain outside the scope of the thesis, however. 
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the  share  of  owned homes  has  increased  from 59% in  1990 to  64% in  2012 
(Statistics Sweden b), which makes Sweden a country with a high rate of home-
ownership  in  Ansell's  definition.2 Moreover,  the  home  is  arguably  the  most 
valuable  financial  asset  to  most  households  (Boverket,  2009)  and on average, 
prices have risen for around 20 years (Bank of International Settlements, 2015). 
Additionally,  right-wing  winds  are  blowing  at  least  since  the  turn  of  the 
millennium,  if  not  the  1990s,  both  in  terms  of  decreased  left-party  voting 
(Statistics Sweden c), and related to this, but more importantly for this thesis, in 
terms of an increasing share of people placing themselves to the right on a left-
right scale (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2009; 2011:68).
Like for other welfare states, research linking political orientations to socio-
economic factors using Swedish data seems to have ignored the role of home-
ownership. To my knowledge, the most recent study on political orientation that 
considers tenure form (i.e. ownership or tenancy) as an independent variable is 
Svallfors  (1999).  He uses  data  from the  beginning of  the  1990s and finds  no 
consistent differences in welfare state attitudes between homeowners and tenants. 
Arguably,  this was at a time when homeownership could be expected to be of 
lesser  relevance  for  political  orientation.  In the light  of more  recent  academic 
debates and findings, primarily by Ansell, and considering that Sweden in the last 
20  years  has  been  characterized  by  rising  house-prices,  credit  market 
deregulations,  low  interest  rates,  tax  and  credit-rule  changes  regarding  tenure 
forms,  right  to  buy  policies,  higher  structural  unemployment  and  notions  of 
permanent  austerity  (i.e.  fiscal  pressures  towards  welfare  state  retrenchment; 
Pierson,  1998:554),  I  expect  that  tenure  form  matters  for  individual  life 
circumstances  today  (cf.  Jones  et  al,  2007:129-136).3 It  is  thus  of  interest  to 
explore if a hitherto unnoticed difference in political views according to tenure 
form can be found in Sweden. Hence, I ask if homeownership is associated with 
political orientation. In particular, I draw on the fact that the left-right dimension 
is of great salience and relevance in Sweden, both to citizens and to parties, and 
that  it  structures  attitudes  towards  the  welfare  state  (Oscarsson  & Holmberg, 
2013a:227ff; Mair, 2007:207ff). The main research question is:
Is  there  a  relationship  between  homeownership  and  left-right  orientation  in  
Sweden?
I  delve  into  the  relationship  in  some  detail.  After  having  answered  the  main 
question,  I  follow Ansell  and explore if  the relationship  is  stronger in  regions 
where house-prices are higher. If this is so, it is consistent with homeownership 
relating to left-right orientation through its  effect on private economic circum-
stances.  Secondly,  I  investigate  if  the  relationship  is  driven  by any particular 
class-group(s) by considering class-group-specific  effects.  Specifically,  I  ask if 
2The tenure form Bostadsrätt (cooperative apartment) is seen as a form of ownership. Admittedly, data on the  
share of people living in the different tenure forms is more appropriate.  Trends in the housing stock should 
nonetheless reflect trends in tenure. A survey from Statistics Sweden suggests that between 2004 and 2013, the 
share of Swedes living classed as tenants, or renters, decreased from around 34,6 to 31,3% and the share of home 
owners increased from around 63,4% to 66,5% (Statistics Sweden d). 
3Discussions and analyses of Swedish housing policy changes and differences in political treatment of tenure 
forms are provided in Christophers (2013), Lindbom (2001a; b), Persson (2001) and Bengtsson (2013). See also 
Werne (2010).
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homeownership  is  associated  with  a  more  rightist  orientation  among  certain 
leftist-oriented class groups as suggested by Dunleavy (1979). This is of further 
interest  given  an  apparent  weakening  of  the  relationship  between  class  and 
political orientation in Sweden (Oskarson, 1994; Evans, 1999; 2000; Oscarsson & 
Holmberg,  2013a:83ff).  Thirdly,  inspired  by  recent  research  suggesting  that 
people  with different  political  baseline affiliations  react  differently to  changed 
economic  circumstances  (Margalit,  2013;  Karadja  et  al,  2014),  I  consider 
differences between groups that prefer different political parties. I formulate these 
further investigations in the form of hypotheses at the end of the theory chapter 
(section 2.4). 
My focus on the left-right scale is motivated not only by its importance in 
Sweden, but also by the fact that the literature does not suggest if a specific issue 
preference should be given primacy in the analysis. Still, since left-right position 
is correlated with preferences on more specific welfare state related issues of high 
salience I consider these too. And I consider if the relationship between home-
ownership  and  left-right  orientation  is  reflected  in  party  preferences.  This  is 
because the Swedish political landscape remains highly structured around the left-
right dimension and parties are perceived to hold different positions towards left-
right-related issues (Oscarsson & Holmberg,  2013a:227ff).  In order to make a 
claim that is generalizable to the entire Swedish population, I rely on a statistical 
analysis of survey data.
The thesis is structured as follows. First, I consider the theoretical and social 
relevance  of  the  question,  and  I  narrow down the  scope  so  as  to  principally 
concern the relationship between political orientations and tenure form in Sweden 
today. In the following theory chapter, I mention how left-right orientation may 
relate  to  more  specific  issue  and party  preferences  in  Sweden,  my appending 
dependent  variables.  I  then  discuss  alternative  independent  variables  in  the 
preference-literature and note that homeownership has been omitted but merits 
attention. I then discuss the theoretical and empirical findings on homeownership 
and political  views. Thereafter, I turn to preference formation and discuss how 
homeownership may affect political views. In the following methods chapter, I 
discuss  research  design,  survey data  choice,  models,  interpretations,  and some 
factors which will be hard to deal with outright. The analysis comes thereafter, 
followed by a discussion on the findings and suggestions for further research.  
1.1 Motivation
The potential relevance of the study is easily made clear. I have already situated 
the study in a current debate about the relationship between aggregate political 
outcomes,  where  homeowners  are  argued  (and  recently  found)  to  hold  more 
rightist views which in turn affects policy. Thus the study can be thought of as 
providing further insights into the plausibility of the causal macro-relationship by 
investigating an individual-level mechanism in the Swedish case (cf. Hedström & 
Swedberg, 1998). 
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Furthermore, and more in line with my scope, I argue that homeownership is a 
factor  that  has  been  neglected  in  studies  on  political  views.  Not  least  given 
increases in ownership rates and house-prices the last  20 years,  the theoretical 
relevance of homeownership should be empirically explored. And since it could 
help  understanding reorientations  among the  electorate,  a  relationship  between 
tenure form and political orientation is interesting regardless of the nature of its 
role for macro-level outcomes. Indeed, homeownership could help explaining a 
rightwards displacement within the electorate found by Oscarsson & Holmberg 
(2013a:223; cf. Schwartz & Seabrooke, 2008:242f). 
Additionally,  at least in Sweden, the socioeconomic factor that has received 
the most attention in studies that try to relate political orientations to life circum-
stances is arguably class-position (Oskarson et al, 2010). This relationship seems 
to be changing or weakening (Oskarson, 1994; Evans; 1999; 2000; Oscarsson & 
Holmberg, 2013a). If homeownership is associated with more rightist orientations 
among  traditionally  leftist  class  groups in  particular,  it  could  also  account  for 
some of the changing or weakening relationship between class and political views.
Finally, an independent link between the large group of homeowners and left-
right  orientation  in  Sweden  could  not  only  help  explaining  an  underlying 
displacement  of the electorate.  It  could also matter  for policy,  as the political 
orientations of the public may influence political decisions through votes, polling, 
etc. (Owens & Paddula, 2013:1104; Rehm et al, 2012:387; Lynch & Myrskylä, 
2009:1094). In Sweden, this is especially the case for issues pertaining to left-
right orientation, related specific (welfare state) issues and party preferences. Left-
right  orientation  still  structures  Swedish  opinion  and  party  politics  to  a  great 
extent and it concerns fundamental views on what society should be like which 
guide  political  behavior  (Berglund  & Oskarson,  2010:184).  Right-wing  winds 
benefit right-wing parties, left-wing winds benefit left-wing parties (Oscarsson & 
Holmberg, 2013a:222; who even characterize the left-right dimension, or conflict, 
as  an  underlying  super-issue).  But  the  theoretical  relationship  between  home-
owners  and  policy  outcomes  easily  returns  us  to  the  macro-relationship. 
Empirically, this is outside my scope, as claimed in the next section.
1.2 Scope
I will refer to the negative correlation between homeownership and welfare state
spending as  the  macro-relationship throughout  the  thesis.  The individual-level 
focus implies that this relationship will be kept in the background. I do not aim to 
empirically assess the importance of homeowners for welfare state retrenchment 
or explain why homeownership rates in Sweden have increased.  In the Swedish 
case, I take macro-relationship questions concerning tenure form rates and welfare 
state spending to be convincingly adressed in an albeit indirect way (see footnote 
3 above for some sources). And it would in all instances require a larger project. I 
merely  note  that  if  homeownership  is  associated  with  more  rightist  political 
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orientations,  then  this  is  consistent with  homeownership  contributing  to,  or 
facilitating, the implementation of welfare state retrenchment. 
The exploration of the political orientation of citizens implies that the role of 
politicians  will  be  kept  in  the  background  too.  Politicians  may  try  to  shape 
preferences and (perceived) interests by drawing on differences between groups to 
accentuate certain divisions while glossing over others, perhaps in order to create 
alliances of support for their policies (Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1993; Kriesi, 1998; 
Korpi  & Palme,  2003:431).  A larger  study that  followed  changes  in  political 
orientation associated with tenure form over time would have to consider how 
politicians treat tenure forms, their motives for the treatment (the supply side of 
politics), and how all this interacts with citizens (the demand side of politics) and 
other welfare state policies (Hout, 1999:317; Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2004:50; cf. 
Müller,  1999:141,  146).  This  would  allow an  assessment  of  tenure  form as  a 
potential  source of  a  political  cleavage.  I  will  restrict  myself  to  making some 
observations  on  the  theoretical  importance  of  homeownership  for  life  circum-
stances. This restriction is appropriate, since even if theory and analysis are based 
on the differences between tenants and homeowners, it is homeownership that is 
in  focus,  and  I  will  use  the  terms  homeownership  and  tenure  form  inter-
changeably. My focus on homeownership is natural since the theory attributes the 
differences in political  orientation related to tenure forms to the asset value of 
homes,  but  also  given  the  background  provided  by  the  macro-level  research. 
Furthermore,  a  more  complete  consideration  of  tenure  forms  would  arguably 
require me to consider how these are treated politically, and substantially change 
the scope. 
Just  like  macro-level  scholars  argue that  homeownership  and welfare state 
outcomes  are  causally  linked  (e.g.  Doling  &  Horsewood,  2003;  2005;  2011; 
Castles, 2005), the underlying theory linking tenure form or homeownership to 
political  views  is  causal:  There  are  theoretical  reasons  why  homeownership 
should  affect  preferences.  This  implies  that  there  is  at  least  one  mechanism 
linking homeownership and left-right orientation. Following Ansell (2014) I will 
exploit an observable implication to explore one such mechanism related to the 
asset value of homes.4 And if the relationship shows a pattern consistent with this 
mechanism,  i.e.  if  the  difference  in  left-right  orientation  between  tenants  and 
homeowners  is  larger  where  house-prices  are  higher  (and  this  is  not  because 
tenants place themselves more to the left in these areas), then this  strengthens the 
causal claim. 
But the (sub-individual) mechanism itself, which links homeownership to left-
right orientation, will not be tested. Indeed, the aim to explore if the relationship is 
consistent with the mechanism is best understood as being guided by a heuristic 
that is not under study. It is important to "recognize that mechanisms [...] usually 
are  unobserved  analytical  constructs"  (Hedström  &  Swedberg,  1998:13)  that 
4Thus, I will argue that the difference in political orientation according to tenure form relates to the economic 
situation of homeowners, and thus to the asset value of houses. Instead, it is possible to see homeownership (and  
house values) as a way through which asset endowments affect political views. To me, this is a question of entry  
into the literature rather than a question of right or wrong perspective. And in both instances the mechanism  
relates to the economic situation of the individual. It would surely be interesting to consider other assets in the 
analysis, but it falls outside the scope.
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strengthen a social  theory and the plausibility  of  the empirical  results.  And if 
results are consistent with such a story, I will still not try to  explain empirically 
why the asset value of houses helps explaining the effect of homeownership on 
political orientation (cf. Teorell & Svensson, 2007:246ff). Related to this, in the 
theory  chapter,  I  try  to  steer  clear  of  more  ontological-laden  sub-individual 
speculation  concerning  the  relationship  between  economic  circumstances  and 
political orientation (cf. ibid:256f).
Lastly,  it  should  be  noted  that  I  investigate  a  relationship  between  home-
ownership and political  orientation  or preferences.  It  is  not argued that home-
ownership  or  housing  stock  changes  provide  a  full  explanation  of  right-wing 
winds, election results, changes in the (Swedish) welfare state, or changing left-
right orientations among class groups. I only posit that homeownership may have 
some  explanatory  power  (cf.  Teorell  &  Svensson,  2007:204f),  the  wider 
implications  and  effects  of  which  will  have  to  be  pursued  elsewhere.  But  of 
course, I will relate homeownership to theories that discuss how preferences for 
welfare state-related issues and left-right orientation connect with other variables 
that  may  affect  life  circumstances.  This  situates  the  thesis  theoretically  and 
introduces  some variables  that  should  be  included as  controls  in  the  analysis. 
These topics follow next.
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2  Theory
This  thesis  connects  to  research  on  the  relationship  between  socioeconomic 
characteristics and political views. I start this chapter by discussing how left-right 
orientation can be seen to relate to particular views, party preferences and voting 
(in  Sweden).  This  serves  to  understand  the  relationship  between  my  main 
dependent  variable,  i.e.  left-right  orientation,  and  my  appending  dependent 
variables,  i.e.  issue  and  party  preferences.  I  then  touch  upon  socioeconomic 
variables that have received more attention in research on political views, before 
turning to the relatively neglected variable that is homeownership. Thereafter, I 
discuss  studies  relating  homeownership  to  preferences.  Finally,  I  discuss  a 
mechanism between homeownership and political views before summarizing the 
observations that will guide the analysis. 
2.1 Left-Right orientation, Preferences, and the 
Welfare-State
It is worth discussing how left-right orientation relates to specific issue and party 
preferences.  A common  starting  point  of  studies  about  political  behavior  and 
views is that these are (in part) formed by one's daily experiences and life circum-
stances (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2013a:71f). Thus, scholars often relate left-right 
orientation, issue preferences, party preferences, and voting to structural factors 
which determine life circumstances.5 Specifically, these factors are taken to affect 
one's general orientation, specific views and, in turn, party choice. Thus, views 
and  preferences  are  theorized  to  come  between  the  explanatory  background 
variables and party choice. For instance, Oscarsson & Holmberg (2013a) discuss 
the same background variables to explain voting as Kumlin (2007) does in his 
literature review on welfare state preferences and issue preferences pertaining to 
the welfare state,  and as Berglund & Oskarson (2010) do to explain left-right 
position. This also illustrates that it is natural that I consider research concerning 
all these dependent variables.
5This is not to deny explanations referring to factors such as party competence and leadership. But it would be  
harder to directly link homeownership to such factors, and arguably, they require the inclusion of the supply side  
of politics. 
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Left-right  orientation  is  thus  correlated  with  specific  issue  preferences 
pertaining to the welfare state (cf. Mair, 2007; who claim, but do not criticize, that 
some  scholars  take  left-right  orientation  to  capture  welfare  state  preferences 
generally).  And  since  left-right  orientation  relates  to  more  than  one  issue 
preference, it is conceivable that it in some sense is more underlying than these. 
Specific issue preferences, in turn, concern redistribution, taxes, and the range and 
(especially) depth of related policies concerning matters such as social security, 
benefits,  education,  and healthcare.  They also  concern  the  preferred  boundary 
between public and private, and the scope of government intervention in market 
processes and outcomes (Kumlin 2007; Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2013a:222-230; 
368ff).  These somewhat  more underlying orientations  and preferences,  in turn, 
influence party preferences and choice (Berglund & Oskarson, 2010; Oscarsson & 
Holmberg, 2013a:366ff; cf. Svallfors, 1999:209), which both seem very close to 
each  other  empirically  (Dalton,  2008:172ff;  Güveli  et  al,  2007:136;  Oesch, 
2008:335f).
Although the  relationship  and the  direction  described  above  seem to  have 
support from many political scientists, it is hardly unchallenged.6 But for a causal 
theory of homeownership and political  orientation,  the most important thing is 
that causality does not run from the latter to the former. I defer a discussion about 
this to section 3.4. At all events, life circumstances affect one's broader left-right 
orientation, more narrowly defined welfare state related issue preferences, party 
preferences and vote. And all these things structure (Swedish) politics to a large 
extent  (Kumlin,  2007;  Mair,  2007;  Oscarsson & Holmberg,  2013a:222f).7 The 
correlation between these factors is not perfect, however. This suggests that their 
relationship to homeownership should differ to some extent (because of personal 
experiences  that  affects  one's  preferences  for  a  specific  policy  but  not  one's 
broader orientation, particular party strategies, local or idiosyncratic events, etc). 
But naturally, completely divergent results would suggest that something is odd. I 
will  remind the reader about this  seemingly plain observation when I consider 
specific preferences in the analysis.
2.2 Socioeconomic Variables and Preferences
I now discuss specific variables that affect political views through their influence 
on life-circumstances. The discussion serves to introduce homeownership as such 
a variable, which has received relatively little attention, but also other factors that 
I include as control variables in the analysis to come. 
   Depending on the context, researchers have explored the role of variables such 
as  ethnicity,  gender,  religion  and  region  of  residence  for  preferences.  Among 
socioeconomic factors, the role of class and factors relating to one's labor market 
6For  instance,  Brown-Iannuzzi  et  al  (2015)  claim  that  ideological  orientation  sometimes  serves  as  ex-post  
justification of political behavior. But on salient issues Carsey & Layman (2006) claim that views affect party 
choice more often than the other way around.
7To say that left-right orientation structures Swedish politics to a large extent is not to deny the existence of  
coexisting dimensions, such as the libertarian-authoritarian (Berglund & Oskarson, 2010).
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position seems to have received most of the attention. In Sweden, class seems to 
have  been  the  dominant  explanatory  factor  for  political  preferences,  and 
differences  in  left-right  orientation  in  particular  have  often  been  seen  as  best 
understood as a class division or conflict (ibid:74; cf. Mair, 2007:213;  Berglund 
& Oskarson, 2010). 
The  academic  discussion  concerning  class  voting  and  preferences,  how  it 
relates  to  other  variables,  and  to  views  on  the  welfare  state,  is  large.  At  the 
individual  level,  political  scientists  and  sociologists  operationalize  class  by 
occupational  position  in  the  labor  market  (Bengtsson,  2010;  Goldthorpe, 
2012:204f; Scott 1994; 2002). Variables that relate to class, and which potentially 
explain away or mediate effects on political preferences, should be separated from 
this class definition and conceptualized as individual attributes. These attributes 
include  labor  income,  economic  risk  and  prospects,  education,  group 
identification,  social  status,  parental  class,  and  consumption  habits,  etc.  The 
separation  avoids  the  risk  of  letting  class  become  everything,  and  it  renders 
empirical variation theoretically visible and meaningful to study.8 This means that 
different variables should be analyzed in their own right, and in interaction with 
other variables, and that they are not to be used interchangeably. And, at least as 
long  as  we  allow  that  people  are  able  to  see  themselves  from  different 
perspectives,  these  variables  may  under  some  circumstances  (for  instance,  if 
political  discourse mobilizes  around them) affect  preferences  and make salient 
other structural divisions.
Gender and sector of employment (public or private) have been suggested as 
potential sources of division which cross-cut class structures, and which pertain to 
left-right  placement  and  preferences  which  I  will  focus  upon (ibid;  Svallfors, 
1999:206f). It is suggested that public sector employees, who are often women, 
have a  rational interest in an extensive public sector and thus higher taxes and 
welfare state spending. It is also suggested that women are socialized into caring 
for others, which would make them positive towards inequality-reducing welfare 
state  policies.  Both  rationality  and  socialization  are  two  mechanisms  used  to 
explain  relationships  between  socioeconomic  variables  and  political  views. 
Findings  are  often consistent  with  both (cf.  Weakliem & Heath,  1995),  and I 
return to these concepts of preference formation when I discuss the mechanism 
relating homeownership to left-right orientation in section 2.4. 
Homeownership  has  been proposed as  another  potential  source  of  division 
(Svallfors, 1999; Dunleavy, 1979), or perhaps attribute, that cross-cuts class. To 
start with, homeownership is found within all class groups. If it is associated with 
a  rightwards  orientation,  this  could  accentuate  the rightist  views of  traditional 
right-wing groups. Perhaps more importantly,  people in more leftist,  or middle 
oriented  groups,  may  be  pulled  rightwards.  Homeownership  would  then  help 
explaining changing class patterns in preferences, such as the apparent weakening 
of  the  class-preference  relationship  in  Sweden  (Oskarson,  1994;  Evans  1999; 
2000). In the analysis, I will explore the cross-cutting effects of homeownership 
8It also admits the view that social structures, at least in the form of relational class structures, are not all there is  
in the world. The existence of variation in attributes across individuals and class groups seems to allow for free  
agents.
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by considering the relationship between tenure form and political orientation in 
different class groups.  
In Britain, homeownership has been an object of interest to political scientists 
and sociologists, perhaps because of particular housing policies and their relation 
to the political and institutional context. But in Sweden and elsewhere it seems to 
have received relatively casual attention in studies on political views of citizens. 
Not least its asset aspect has been neglected (Schwartz & Seabrooke, 2008). The 
omission is probably due to the traditionally salient role of labor market relation-
ships and labor income for political mobilization and party conflict (Ansell, 2014; 
cf. Bengtsson, 2009), and as such quite natural. But in the wake of increased acces 
to credit, cut welfare state spending and higher structural employment, assets play 
a  larger  role  for  economic  circumstances  in  today's  welfare  states  (Ansell, 
2012:532; Jones et al, 2007:129-136). And homes are arguably the most important 
financial asset to many Swedes (Boverket, 2009). Additionally, homeownership 
makes possible tax deductions and borrowing which may affect the perception of 
one's situation even when they are not used. Furthermore, both homeownership 
rates  and prices  have risen the last  20 years  (Statistics  Sweden b;  e;  Bank of 
International Settlements, 2015). This suggests that it is important to consider the 
impact of a factor that is of potential relevance both to people and to society at 
large.  It is time to discuss studies that involve the relationship between home-
ownership and political views. Symptomatically, recent studies concerning views 
in their own right are very few. 
2.3 Homeownership and Left-Right Orientation: The 
Literature
Here, I discuss the literature on homeownership and political preferences. I pay 
attention  to  how studies  find  the  two  to  relate,  notably  if  the  asset-aspect  of 
housing is considered. I also touch upon to methods and material used to develop 
and test the theories, and I note findings or conjectures that my research design 
will allow me to explore.
I start with the researchers who are more concerned with the macro-relation-
ship, with questions of how housing markets relate  to welfare states, and with 
explaining variation in homeownership rates. At best, these researchers try to infer 
an individual-level mechanism in the form of individual perceptions, preferences 
and behavior from aggregated data (Doling & Horsewood, 2003:299-306). Even 
Schwartz & Seabrooke (2008), who call for a reassessment of the importance of 
housing  as  an  asset  in  today's  political  economies,  remain  speculative  about 
individual-level  relationships.  Because  of  this  speculativeness  I  abstract  from 
details which require quite precise assumptions, and focus the general picture. It 
will be seen that no specific issue preference is given primacy across scholars. 
This makes the more general left-right dimension a natural choice of dependent 
variable for the analysis. One may criticize the macro-level researchers for not 
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developing and testing their  theories  on both individual-level  mechanisms and 
preferences.  But  it  is  of  coures  not  completely  just  to  criticize  the  theories 
themselves  for  being  under-developed,  since  the  main  aim  of  (most  of)  the 
researchers  is  elsewhere.  After  discussing  macro-relationship  researchers,  I 
consider studies using individual-level data. Since these come more close to my 
thesis they get more room. Throughout, I relate the discussion to the analysis to 
come.
2.3.1 Macro-Level Studies
The sociologist Jim Kemeny (2001; 2005a) claims to be the first to suggest and 
observe  a  negative  relationship  between  homeownership  and  welfare  state 
spending.  Preference  differences  between  homeowners  and  renters  seem 
important to Kemeny's theories about how housing links to aggregate outcomes, 
but  for  reasons  that  I  have  failed  to  identify  he  appears  to  take  them  as 
uncheckable.  Moreover,  he does not make a clear  distinction between housing 
preferences and political preferences (even if the former depend on the political 
context, they remain beyond the scope of the thesis) and he seems concerned with 
both. Still, he argues (Kemeny, 2005a:65ff) that people will tend to opt for9 home-
ownership as a means to provide themselves with an asset to privately finance 
welfare state services, especially pensions, when the public schemes are perceived 
to deteriorate in quality. When one's home is sellable, or provides security that can 
be borrowed against on the capital-market, owners will be less likely to feel the 
need for taxation-funded provision of social security and redistribution. The home 
thus becomes a form of private insurance. Since retirees will need it more, and be 
better able to use it, its importance increases at retirement. Hence, all else equal, 
homeowners should be less inclined to prefer social insurance and redistribution 
than tenants since they perceive the need for it to be smaller. Unfortunately, data 
do not include questions on preferences for social  insurance and redistribution 
outright. But the latter may be quite close to preferences for a reduced income 
gap, a variable I will consider. 
Research  on  the  macro-relationship  has  been  taken  up  by  Castles  (1998; 
2005), Conley & Gifford (2006), Doling & Horsewood (2003; 2005; 2011) and 
Stamsö  (2010)  who  all  use  macro-level  data  on  selected  welfare  states.  The 
relationship seems well-established, except in southern Europe, but the direction 
of causality and its substantive importance elude. Doling & Horsewood (2011), 
recognizing  the  economic  role  of  homeownership,  find  some  evidence  that 
between 1989 and 2003, increased house-prices predict cuts in public spending on 
pensions in some OECD countries. This is not the case for Sweden.10 Elsewhere 
(Doling & Horsewood, 2003), they find that rising house-prices is associated with 
earlier  male  retirement  in the OECD. Relating this  to  Kemeny's  theories,  they 
assume  that  homeownership  entails  greater  individual  financial  independence 
9I would prefer to say that people may become more inclined to perceive houses as assets. Kemeny is unclear  
about if he sees an individual's choice of tenure form as independent of housing policies and individual earnings.
10Political and institutional factors, like the early reform of the Swedish pension system, would probably help  
understanding this.
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from the welfare state as it allows for intertemporal redistribution of resources 
over  the life-cycle  (consumption smoothing).  However,  although their  findings 
indicate  that  homes  affect  the  economic  circumstances  of  their  owners,  they 
remain quite suggestive about individual-level preferences (and behavior).  
Van Gent (2011) and Malpass (2007) criticize Kemeny for neglecting politics. 
They can be classed among researchers who investigate the political-discursive 
moves of governments, especially in the UK, towards championing asset-based 
welfare  (Gurney,  1999;  Ronald,  2006;  2008;  De  Decker  &  DeWilde,  2010; 
Finlayson, 2009; Doling & Ronald, 2010a; b; Ronald & Doling, 2012; Watson, 
2009; 2010). The idea behind asset-based welfare discourses is to make citizens 
more  self-reliant,  free  market-friendly  and  both  willing  and  able  to  finance 
welfare service consumption themselves. Thus a general policy aim is to affect 
mind-states  and  make  people  think  of  themselves  as  individual  investors  and 
investment-objects through information campaigns, etc. Housing plays a key role, 
and homeownership has been actively promoted as an important asset that should 
make people feel less dependent of the public sector and of public welfare, and 
more supportive of notions of individual property rights and responsibility. I will 
use the term ontological independence for this quite abstract idea of an ideological 
mechanism between homeownership and political  views.11 Researchers seem to 
criticize  these  government  strategies  and  discursive  moves  quite  unanimously 
(though Seabrooke,  2010, has a slightly different  perspective).  But they rarely 
explore the individual-level effects of the policies on preference formation or on 
political  orientation  (a  partial  exception  is  De Decker  & DeWilde,  2010,  who 
conduct in-depth interviews; cf. Jones et al, 2007; Naumanen et al, 2012).  
2.3.2 Micro-Level Studies
Among  research  that  directly  focuses  individuals,  I  begin  with  an  in-depth 
interview  study  concerning  Sweden.  Although  the  aim  differs  from  mine, 
something I discuss further in the methods chapter, it touches aspects which relate 
to tenure form and preferences. I then consider studies which use survey data and 
statistical  methods.  Since  homeownership  is  relatively  neglected  in  preference 
studies,  they  are  few.  They  include  two  Swedish  studies,  but  foremost  some 
research from Britain, where the debate about homeownership has been livelier. I 
conclude with a recent international study.
Andersson et al (2007) is to my knowing the only recent Swedish study which 
explores how housing relates to ways of thinking about potentially political issues. 
They conduct in-depth interviews where they analyze the views on housing of 
Swedish  and  Finnish  homeowners  (twenty  per  country)  and  tenants  (ten  per 
country)  in  one  city  in  each  country,  sampling  according  to  socioeconomic 
criteria.  They  do  not  overtly  relate  their  findings  to  political  preferences.  In 
Sweden,  they  find  that  the  choice  of  homeownership  seems  to  be  less  of  a 
normative and more of a practical issue. Here, tenants and homeowners equally 
11I see no way in which data would permit  me to get  at  this quite abstract  mechanism. Thus in relation to  
egotropy that I introduce in section 2.4, it will not play a major role in guiding the thesis.
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associate  their  housing  with  security.  People,  especially  owners  who  did  not 
personally experience the housing market crash in the early 1990s, deem home-
ownership to have individual economic advantages in the long run (respondents 
recognize  systemic  uncertainties,  but  they  do  not  immediately  link  them  to 
themselves). Contrary to the Finnish, Swedish homeowners seem to think that it is 
acceptable to use the house to finance expenditures  in case of need, and they 
could  consider  liquidating  it  after  retirement.  But  somewhat  confusingly,  they 
claim not to see houses as nest-eggs, which Finnish homeowners do.
Oscarsson & Holmberg (2013a) are the leading researchers of the program for 
studies of Swedish electoral outcomes (Svensk valundersökning). They use survey 
data.  Although  traditionally  more  salient  socioeconomic  factors  receive  much 
more attention, the difference in right and left voting depending on tenure form 
has been reported for each election since 1976. Homeowners are always found 
more  prone  to  vote  for  the  right  than  tenants.  The  difference  has  steadily 
decreased over time,  although an increase is  registered for the 2010 elections. 
Note that their analyses on this point are strictly bivariate.    
Remaining  in  Sweden,  Svallfors  (1999)  explores  the  role  of  class  for 
preferences  over  time  with  cross-sectional  survey  data  from  1986  and  1992. 
Besides  class,  he considers  gender,  employment  sector  and homeownership  as 
new sources of division. He posits that homeowners should support the welfare 
state  since  they  are  exposed  to  greater  financial  risk  –  the  then  quite  recent 
housing crash may influence this reasoning. In his full model, he finds few, but 
seemingly contradictory,  effects  of  homeownership  on welfare  state  attitudinal 
indices. Compared to tenants, homeowners supported more public social spending 
in 1986, and more privately financed welfare in 1992. This seems to be the most 
recent multivariate study on preferences that include tenure form in Sweden. It 
should be noted that Svallfors does not consider house-price variations. 
I now turn to international, mainly British, researchers. Dunleavy (1979) uses 
the concept of consumption sectors to derive a potential cleavage between people 
who use a private-individual mode of consumption and people who use a public-
collective mode. Housing is an object that can be consumed in both modes and 
which is  politically  salient.  I  do not  dare say if  Dunleavy's  arguments  can be 
straightforwardly linked to the asset-aspect of housing and the economic situation 
of voters. Rather, he investigates both the demand and supply side of politics and 
argue that consumption modes form a new division in British society. He applies 
then-novel logistic regression to survey data from the 1974 British elections, and 
finds that private-individual  consumption of housing significantly increases the 
likelihood to vote Conservative. The effect of a private-individual consumption 
mode  thus  reinforces  class  alignment  among  the  upper  middle  class.  On  the 
working and lower middle-classes it has a cross-pressure effect: The labor market 
position  of  workers  suggests  a  leftist  orientation,  but  their  ownership  position 
suggests a rightist one.
I will pick up on this finding of cross-pressure by considering class-specific 
relationships between homeownership and left-right orientation. This serves to see 
if particular class groups drive the relationship, and it is of further interest in the 
light of the changing, or weakening, relationship between class and political views 
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in Sweden (Evans, 1999; 2000; Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2013a). I will thus pay 
attention  to whether  homeowners  in  comparatively leftist  class groups show a 
relatively strong association with a more  rightist  orientation.  In Sweden, these 
class groups include miscellaneous white collar workers, service workers, workers 
with supervisory functions and other skilled or non-skilled workers (Bergström & 
Oskarson, 2012). 
In an oft-cited project, Saunders (1990:ch. 4) argues that tenure form entails 
distinct economic interests. With survey data from three British (labor-led) towns 
he uses table analysis to find that homeownership seems to increase Conservative 
voting intention, at least in the lower middle, or intermediate, class. Thus once 
more, class-specific relationships are suggested. He also finds some evidence that 
purchasing one's former rental apartment affects voting intention in favor of the 
Conservatives.  Using regression analysis,  he finds no effect of tenure form on 
vote in a model that controls for class, but the coding and statistical techniques 
seem  under-developed.12 Furthermore,  he  addresses  Kemeny's  theory.  In  table 
analysis, he finds some evidence that when confronted with the choice between 
higher taxes and better services or lower taxes and poorer services, homeowners 
are less opposed to tax cuts and welfare spending cuts than tenants. On specific 
policy  areas,  he  finds  ambivalent  or  counter-theoretical  attitudes.  Instead  of 
stressing possible  lack  of  representativity,  the low number  of observations  (ca 
350), or under-developed regression techniques, Kemeny (2001:63f) has replied 
that  homeowners  may not necessarily be against the idea of the welfare state. 
Rather,  they are less  resistant  to  cuts  in  a  latent  manner.  It  is  questionable  if 
Kemeny salvages the theory by precluding its testability on the micro-level.
Evans (1993) uses survey data to support his claim that the effect of class on 
Conservative  or  Labour  party  preference  runs  through  one's  perceived  labor 
market prospects (expected income and promotion),  more than through current 
income:  Thinking one's  own economic situation will  improve could make one 
more skeptical of redistribution and collective solutions. He finds evidence of this, 
prospects cancel the effect of income. Moreover, he finds homeownership to have 
a  significant  positive  effect  on one's  preferences  for  the  Conservatives  among 
older employees,  and argues that  homeownership relates more to one's  current 
material situation as opposed to future labor market prospects. Unfortunately, he 
does not consider how homeownership itself relates to one's (non-labor market) 
financial position.
I  now  turn  to  the  seemingly  only  recent  study  on  homeownership  and 
preferences  (Ansell;  2014;  cf.  Ansell  & Broz,  2013).  Ansell  argues  that  asset 
prices are of increasing importance for the economic circumstances of welfare 
state citizens (cf. Conley & Gifford, 2006:56f; Doling & Ford, 2007:116f). More 
explicitly than Kemeny, he draws on the argument that homeownership supplies 
the  individual  with  an  important  asset  to  be  sold  or  borrowed against  on  the 
capital-market as a substitute for social insurance, perhaps more so for pensions 
since retirement  is easier  to foresee and plan for than unemployment.  He also 
12He omits class-tenure interactions that he himself proposes are central, and his three-group class coding seems 
crude. It is not entirely clear why class is included and why income is not. Actually, it is unclear if he wants to 
establish a tenure form relationship, or rather explain voting.
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notes that households often expect prices to rise even when this expectation would 
seem irrational. He investigates preference differences according to tenure form, 
arguing  that  when  house-prices  (are  expected  to)  rise,  this  tilts  homeowner 
preferences rightward towards lower taxes and less redistribution. He uses panel 
survey data for the US (from 2000 and 2004) in combination with regional data on 
house-price changes, and for the UK (seven years between 1991 and 2006), where 
respondents  are  asked  about  their  house  value.  He  finds  that  house-prices 
substantially  affect  preferences  for social  security (in  the US),  for government 
responsibility for full employment and placement on an ideology index (in the 
UK) in the predicted way. Moreover, with pooled cross-sectional survey data for 
29  countries  from  2009,  he  finds  rising  house-prices  to  reduce  support  for 
redistributive policies,  while homeownership itself  is associated with increased 
support. Sweden is part of the pooled data, but country-specific relationships are 
not identified.  Furthermore, he draws on Margalit (2013) and finds that leftist-
oriented  people  seem insensitive  (in  the  US)  or  less  sensitive  (in  Europe)  to 
changes in their personal economic circumstances. Instead, the effects of house-
price  changes  are  driven by rightist-oriented  people.  Finally,  Ansell  finds  that 
house-prices  affect  welfare  spending  policies  the  most  under  right-wing 
governments in countries with high homeownership rates (above the median of 
61.75%). 
The study thus suggests that people with different baseline orientations may 
react differently to ownership and perhaps also that retirees respond differently to 
homeownership than workers (though Ansell does not explore this last point). But 
foremost,  it  suggests  exploiting price variations  to uncover a price mechanism 
between homeownership and preferences. (Unfortunately, Ansell does not show 
models  where  homeownership  is  included  before  controls  for  price  changes, 
which would allow a better evaluation of this reasoning.) It is time to discuss this 
mechanism some more. 
2.4 Preference Formation and Homeownership: A 
Mechanism
People act, variables do not. Thus it is important for a causal theory between two 
variables to include a, preferably testable, link or idea of about why the one affects 
the other (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998). Hence in this section, I relate home-
ownership to questions of preference formation. I briefly discuss the seemingly 
competing  theories  of  rationality  and socialization,  and I  note  that  the  former 
seems to gain in popularity at  the expense of the latter.  But the discussion of 
socialization and rationality goes far beyond my scope. Instead, I merely posit that 
individual  economic  circumstances  are  likely  to  matter  for  political  views 
(perhaps to different extents in groups with different baseline orientation). This 
leads  to  the  asset-price  mechanism  linking  homeownership  to  left-right 
orientation. 
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   As  the  example  from  employment  sector  in  section  2.2  suggests,  it  is 
conceivable that one could hold views because they are perceived to be in one's 
interest  as  well  as  because  one  identifies  with  a  group of  people  who do so. 
Explanations of preference formation often evoke either some understanding of 
rationality or  of  socialization,  or  both  (Oscarsson  &  Holmberg,  2013a:70ff). 
While socialization seems to have been the primary explanatory mechanism for 
political  behavior  some  generations  ago,  some  notion  of  rationality  is  now 
increasingly  popular.  In  Sweden,  a  claim  of  increased  subjective  rational 
assessment  seems  to  get  support:  It  is  increasingly  common  that  respondents 
evoke  issue  voting,  in  practice  left-right  voting,  and  voting  relating  to  party 
competence to explain their behavior while reasons such as habit have become 
more  rare  (ibid:70ff,180ff,  233ff).  Additionally,  it  was  seen  above  that  some 
scholars argue that homeownership has individualizing effects (Kemeny, 2001), 
not  least  through public  homeownership discourses which aim to make home-
owners  act  as  rational  economic  agents  (Malpass,  2008;  van  Gent,  2011; 
Finlayson, 2009). It would of course be tempting to fit homeownership with some 
notion of increasing individual-rational preference formation. 
But while homeownership may have individualizing effects, which could give 
room for  some  notion  of  individual-rational  preference  formation,  this  hardly 
excludes socialization by definition. For instance, critics of British homeowner-
ship discourses would probably argue that homeowners are socialized towards (an 
instrumental  form  of  individual)  rationality  (cf.  Finlayson,  2009;  Saunders, 
1990:56). And irrespective of its  implications  for the increasing importance of 
some notion of rationality, socialization seems to remain important for preference 
formation (Jennings, 2007; Westholm, 1999), probably in interaction with genetic 
heritage (Alford et al, 2005; Kandler et al, 2011). Disentangling how homeowner-
ship affects preferences via some concept of rationality and interests either at the 
individual or group level as opposed to socialization and habit would require a 
fine-tuned conceptual arsenal and a consideration of the interaction of both the 
demand  and  supply  sides  of  politics  (Oscarsson  &  Holmberg,  2013:70ff), 
unsuitable for a project of this size. Moreover, my data will not allow it.13
Thus,  like  probably any concept,  the meaning and analytical  usefulness  of 
rationality  depends  on  the  qualifying  assumptions  made  about  it  (Rothstein, 
2003:ch.  2;  Weakliem  &  Heath,  1995).  Even  if  homeownership  does 
individualize, I find it redundant to hinge the investigation of homeownership and 
preferences upon such qualifications.14 Instead, I propose the concepts of egotropy 
and  sociotropy  for thinking  about  how homeownership  can relate  to  political 
orientation. Egotropy is the notion that the past development and/or prospects of 
one's private economic situation influences one's views. This means that people 
hold views that can be linked to a seemingly narrow understanding of what is best 
13Matters of rationality and socialization, and related issues of perceived and objective self-interest and group-
interest  even  has  an  ontological  aspect  (cf.  Hollis,  2002).  It  leads  far  beyond  the  relationship  between  
homeownership and preferences.
14In analyses, rationality, however understood, can be seen as a heuristic assumption that enables the formulation 
of  hypotheses,  the  non-rejection  of  which  does not  necessarily  indicate  the  validity  of  the  assumption  (cf.  
Lundquist,  1993:84f).  This  also means that  it  is  not  unproblematic to  take a preference  difference  between  
homeowners and tenants as evidence of the same conceptualization of rationality. (This relates to the fact that  
concluding anything about how a mechanism on the sub-individual level works is beyond my scope.)
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for their own private situation. Sociotropy replaces the private economic situation 
with that of the nation (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007). For voting, sociotropy is 
generally  found more  common  and important,  both  in  Sweden  and elsewhere 
(ibid; Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2013:202ff; cf. Lewis-Beck et al, 2008; Duch & 
Stevenson, 2006; however, it is unclear if sociotropy precludes that one uses the 
individual situation as proxy for the national situation (cf. Nannestad & Paldam, 
2000).
It  is  noteworthy that  results  in  research on political  views and preferences 
seem to be consistent with egotropy more often than research on vote (Kumlin, 
2007;  cf.  Iversen  & Soskice,  2001;  Scheve  & Slaughter,  2001;  Seabrooke  & 
Mortensen, 2008; Rehm, 2009; 2011; Rehm et al, 2012; Berglund & Oskarson, 
2010; Urbatch, 2013; and Lynch & Myrskylä, 2009 for an exception). A possible 
explanation for the difference is that an individual will consider a larger set of 
information when deciding what party to vote for than when thinking about her or 
his (less-obliging) view on (a particular aspect of) the welfare state or her or his 
general political orientation. This is also what Kumlin (2007) argues.
Regarding homeownership, most theories about its effects on political views 
can be taken to assume that the mechanism through which this effect runs relates 
to  the  homeowner's  individual  economic  situation  or  prospects:  house-values 
affect  the  financial  position  of  its  owner  and homes  act  as  a  form of  private 
insurance, not least given high house-values and a deregulated credit-market. All 
this, in turn, colors preferences for the degree and nature of public intervention in 
markets  as  embodied  in  welfare  state  policies,  a  focal  point  of  the  left-right 
dimension. Just like higher income is found to entail more rightist views of labor 
market participants, higher house-values may entail more rightist views of home-
owners. And house-values should capture a mechanism between tenure form and 
left-right orientation just  like income captures a mechanism between class and 
left-right orientation (cf. Kumlin, 2007; Mair, 2007; Berglund & Oskarson, 2012). 
Such a pattern would then seem to suppose some kind of egotropy, regardless of 
how this relates to rationality and socialization. I take this notion that the private 
economic situation may influence preferences as comparatively harmless and well 
anchored in the literature. It will guide the search for a causal mechanism when I 
explore if there is a stronger association between homeownership and political 
orientation in areas where house-prices are higher. But again, egotropy itself is not 
under study.
Lastly, a recent finding related to egotropy merits mention. The importance of 
one's  private  economic  situation  and prospects  seems to matter  differently for 
different people depending on their baseline ideology or values. Margalit (2013) 
finds  that  preferences  for  redistribution  and  state  intervention  of  Democratic 
voters are less affected by changing individual economic circumstances than the 
preferences of Republican voters. Republican-oriented voters become more leftist 
when  economic  times  are  hard  and  as  expectations  get  better  they  return 
rightwards.  Democratic-oriented  voters,  however,  are  insensitive  to  changed 
personal circumstances.  Naturally,  there is less room for Democrats to become 
more leftist-oriented, but a ceiling effect provides only a partial account for the 
differences. In a Swedish context, Möllerström (2014) and Karadja et al (2014) 
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suggest  related  findings:  Right-wing  party  supporters  respond  to  (positive) 
changes in perceptions of their relative economic situation by adopting even more 
right-wing  preferences  (no  ceiling  effect  is  detected).  Non-right-wing  party 
supporters do not. This suggests that egotropy is less important for leftist-oriented 
people than for rightist-oriented people. And both findings suggest that it can be 
fruitful to look for different relationships between homeownership and political 
orientation in different groups. Thus after having explored the general relation-
ship, its variation according to regional price differences, and class-group-specific 
relationships,  I  will  explore  if  homeownership  and political  orientations  relate 
differently in different political groups.
2.5 Summing Up
I  now summarize the theories and tie them together  in the choice of left-right 
orientation  as  main  dependent  variable.  I  extract  the  theories  and  empirical 
findings discussed above that will guide the analysis, and I formulate hypotheses.
The theories and findings suggest that several specific issue preferences are 
expected  to  be  affected  by  homeownership  (note  that  Ansell  uses  different 
dependent  variables  in  his  analyses).  Kemeny  suggests  that  homeownership 
affects preferences for taxes, social security and redistribution. The latter two are 
confirmed by Ansell, who also considers a composite ideology-index. This is also 
considered by Svallfors (who finds no effect). Dunleavy and Saunders find some 
association  between  homeownership  and  party  preferences.  Discourse-oriented 
macro-theorists would arguably lead us to suggest effects on any preference that 
pertains  to the welfare state and the preferred border between politics  and the 
market. 
Since the macro-theories on preferences are relatively underdeveloped and the 
micro-studies are few, I see no obvious main dependent variable. But as I stated in 
section 2.1,  left-right  orientation correlates  (empirically  and theoretically)  with 
specific preferences pertaining to the welfare state. It thus allows me to take the 
theories and findings concerning homeownership and preferences as a whole, and 
study  an  important  variable  that  structures  Swedish  politics.  Arguably  (but 
somewhat less importantly), it is more underlying than party preferences, and thus 
less sensitive to unobserved idiosyncracies. It may also be more structural than 
specific preferences. Oscarsson & Holmberg use it to depict  underlying changes 
in the electorate towards more rightist orientations, changes that theories suggest 
is relatable to homeownership rates (and price increases). Left-right orientation 
also adresses concerns that I choose a specific preference as dependent variable 
because this is where I find significance. I thus hypothesize that homeownership 
is related to left-right orientation in the sense that it  is associated with a more 
rightist orientation. 
Having explored this, I proceed to investigate an egotropic mechanism that 
links homeownership to political orientation by hypothesizing that the relationship 
between homeownership and left-right orientation is stronger when house-values 
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are  higher.  I  will  do  this  by  splitting  the  sample  according  to  geographic 
differences in values, the variation that Ansell uses for the USA. Here, my choice 
of  independent  variable  has  a  further  advantage.  Coincidentally,  left-right 
orientation leaves me with more observations than any particular issue preference. 
This is good since the models include a large set of control variables, and splitting 
the sample requires many observations.  Regarding the more abstract  notion of 
ontological independence as a potential mechanism, I see no good way to capture 
it.  Yet,  one  may  assume  that  if  tenure  form  differences  in  preferences  are 
insensitive to price variations, then they are caused by this. I will mention it at 
some points, but it is not in focus. 
After exploring the mechanism, I investigate if the relationship is driven by 
certain groups and I hypothesize that homeownership has cross-pressure effects 
that helps accounting for a loosening up of the relationship between class and 
political  orientation  as  suggested  by  Dunleavy.  Specifically,  homeowners  in 
leftist-oriented class groups  may be subject to cross-pressure since their class-
position  suggests  a  leftist  orientation  but  their  ownership  position  suggests  a 
rightist  one.  I also hypothesize that the relationship differs among groups with 
different party preferences inspired by Margalit and Karajda and coworkers. 
 Regarding specific issue and party preferences that correlate with left-right 
orientation, I see no reason not to explore these. As they correlate, I hypothesize 
that a difference in left-right orientation should be expected to show in some, but 
not  necessarily  all  of  these.  I  thus  consider  preferences  for  reduced  income 
differences (the closest I come to redistribution, the variable that Ansell uses for 
Europe), taxes, welfare state services, public sector size and privatization (but not 
social insurance). I also hypothesize that the relationship is reflected in the less 
underlying variable that is party preferences, with homeowners being more likely 
to  prefer  rightist  parties.  I  stress  that  these  analyses  should  be  regarded  as 
appending in relation to left-right orientation. A full discussion of each of these 
dependent variables and their relationship to left-right orientation would require 
more space. 
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3 Methodological Matters
In this chapter, I discuss methodological matters. Firstly, I explain the choice of a 
nationally representative survey as data for my study. I then discuss the statistical 
research design I  apply to this data,  and the actual  choice of data.  I end with 
discussing some concerns that my research design may raise. These include things 
which survey data  are  less appropriate  to capture,  assumptions  inherent  to my 
method  that  should  be  made  explicit,  and  questions  of  omitted  variables  and 
reverse causality.  
3.1 Research Design 
It seems natural to ask people about their views in order to get an idea of what 
they are.15 This suggests the use either of statistical methods on survey data or of 
in-depth  interviews.  Using  survey  data  fits  the  main  purpose  of  finding  an 
independent  (isolated)  relationship  between  homeownership  and  left-right 
orientation generalizable to the entire Swedish population. These possibilities to 
isolate and generalize are probably the main reasons why survey studies seem to 
dominate  the empirical  literature  on political  views. The use of  interviews in-
depth, in turn, arguably permits a more nuanced understanding of the meaning of 
a given relationship to the individuals concerned. In the conclusion I touch upon 
how in-depth interviews could complement my results.
Thus, survey data allow an estimate of the difference between homeowners 
and tenants within the entire Swedish population, and they allow an investigation 
of the extent to which these differences remain when controlling for theoretically 
motivated variables that may render the initial effect spurious or biased. I will say 
more about such control variables shortly. Note that it is only possible to directly 
control for confounding factors that are actually asked about in the data. Since 
everything of potential relevance is not and cannot be asked about, I am left with 
the very common and possibly severe problems of potential sources of bias due to 
omitted variables. The ideal solution is to perform a randomized experiment to 
assure that homeowners and tenants do not systematically differ in any observable 
or  unobservable  way  except  in  assigned  homeownership  status.  The  average 
preference difference between the two groups would then be the causal effect due 
15 Not asking people would in all cases seem problematic. But of course, one may believe that people do not  
understand their preferences, or that they do not act accordingly, in which case views would matter less. One 
would perhaps like to study actions instead (although it  is  probably hard to observe enacted  views without  
inferential problems). But were there no connection between views and actions it is an open question if either  
would be meaningful to study.
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to being  treated with homeownership (Duflo et al, 2008:3899ff). Unfortunately, 
no ideal solution exists here.
Instead, I have to make use of a control strategy. This means that I explore if 
there  is  a  relationship  between  homeownership  and  political  orientation  or 
preferences, and then see if it  holds when I introduce other observed variables 
which are chosen to make homeowners and tenants equal in relevant ways. 16 The 
method is more amenable to a smaller  study such as mine,  and it  seems very 
common in research on preferences; it is used in a large majority of the statistical 
individual-level studies discussed in the theory chapter. For instance, Kitschelt & 
Rehm (2014) posit that work experiences matter for political preferences and use 
survey data to establish a relationship or correlation between their  independent 
and dependent variables. The emphasis is on correlation. If finding causality is a 
primary goal (I would think of it  as simply a later  goal;  cf.  Pickstone,  2000), 
unveiling a mere connection may be somewhat disappointing. 
But even if the wisest way to interpret the baseline results are in terms of a 
correlation, my findings will be of interest. Firstly, it is of course true that without 
a connection, there is hardly causality (and I argue in section 3.4 that the results 
are interesting even if the relationship is not causal). But more importantly, if the 
relationship shows a pattern consistent with the causal theory where homes are 
seen as assets, the association is less likely to be spurious (Hedström & Swedberg, 
1998:9) and more likely to catch a causal effect. Moreover, data will allow for 
some fruitful  analyses  regarding group-specific  differences.  Finally,  no similar 
(multivariate) analysis focusing upon Sweden seems to have been performed with 
data  from the last  20 years,  and I  have given arguments  why such a study is 
valuable today. And given lack of experimental or quasi-experimental data, this is 
arguably where any analysis would start.    
3.2 Data
Regarding the actual choice of data, a few recent surveys merit consideration: the 
2012 SOM survey, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2009, the 
2006 Swedish electoral survey (the last to be available in its entirety) and the 2010 
Welfare  state  survey  (Välfärdsstatsundersökningen).  The  latter  includes  no 
question  on  tenure  form,  however.  ISSP  2009  is  rejected  due  to  very  few 
observations (667 of 1,137 respondents). The survey chosen is the cross-sectional 
SOM survey from 2012. This was collected  by the University of Gothenburg, 
using  questionnaires  sent  out  to  a  random  net  sample  of  11,097  people.  Its 
response rate is 57%.17 Unlike in the Swedish electoral  survey,  all  respondents 
16In econometrics, there is a discussion concerning whether one should start with a small model and add control  
variables  or  do  it  the  other  way  around.  Verbeek  (2012:64f)  claims  that  the  latter  is  preferable.  This  
recommendation is probably more relevant when the aim is to explain something in its entirety than when the 
aim is to isolate a relationship.  
17This  is  higher  than  in  SOM 2011 and 2013.  A response  rate  between  60  and  75% seems to  be  deemed  
acceptable (Esaiasson et al, 2012:185), thus I am obviously at the lower bound. The trend with lower response  
rates seems largely due to increased difficulties in reaching the respondents (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2011:100).
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were  asked  questions  on  tenure  form,  left-right  orientation  and  background 
variables.  SOM 2012 asks a very large set of questions, including background 
questions of high interest, and the number of final observations is high. This is 
valuable since it allows me to introduce a large set of variables in the models and 
because I need a large number of observations to explore regional and group-
specific  relationships.  Finally,  in  order  to  explore  the  mechanism,  I  link 
information  on  were  respondents  live  to  house-price  data  from  the  Swedish 
National  Board  of  Housing,  Building  and  Planning  (Boverket)  and  Statistics 
Sweden.
3.3 Models and Estimation
I have not said much in particular about variables or estimation techniques. I will 
discuss  some important  points  concerning these issues  here.  Details  are  better 
given throughout the analysis.
The main dependent variable is one's self-placement on the left-right scale. 
Additionally,  I  will  consider  one's  view on a certain issue or party.  The main 
independent variable is tenure form. These are the principal operationalizations of 
left-right orientation, preferences, and homeownership respectively. For better or 
for worse, this is what data admit.18 There is no strong reason why I choose self-
placement on the left-right dimension instead of a more objectively constructed 
index. I simply argue that one's left-right position captures something politically 
meaningful,  and  that  individual  perceptions  of  their  own  political  views  are 
reasonable, if not just (and individual perceptions are probably what matters most 
to  the individual,  cf.  Oscarsson & Holmberg,  2013a:227).  Moreover,  an index 
would be based on answers to questions which I use as dependent variables in 
appending analyses to explore how homeownership is associated with particular 
left-right-related issue preferences. 
What should be controlled for? In principle, in order to isolate an independent 
relationship between homeownership and political preferences, the main control 
variables should be variables that may affect or relate to both of these (Teorell & 
Svensson, 2007:204f). Not controlling for them would then mar any interpretation 
of a relationship as independent or causal. The most important control variable is 
probably labor market income. Higher income earners are more likely to place 
themselves to the right (Berglund & Oskarson, 2010:191f) and they are probably 
more likely to own their homes. Other control variables that could be related to 
both left-right position and tenure form are class-position, age or retirement status 
and region of residence. Since much of the theory above suggest that retirement 
especially is related to homeownership, I will control for this (the slight difference 
compared to controlling for age is that the association between homeownership 
and left-right proposition becomes somewhat smaller). Regional dummies will be 
18With  the  possible  exception  of  some  economists'  catch-all  ex-post  rationalization  of  behavior  I  find  no 
conceptualization of preferences anywhere. A question like ”what do you think of the proposition to cut taxes?”  
is simply seen to tap into one's preference for tax cuts, and so on. 
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used  to  control  for  the  possibility  that  tenure  forms,  and  homeownership  in 
particular, means different things in different parts of Sweden (cf. Doling & Ford, 
2007:124f)19 
I mentioned the potential problem of unobserved factors in section 3.1. Note 
that, in principle, some observed control variables may proxy unobserved factors 
that  influence  the  dependent  variables  (Teorell  &  Svensson,  2007:204f).  For 
instance,  economists  commonly  control  for  marital  status  in  wage  equations 
(Borjas, 2013). This is not because marital status affects wage, but because the 
average  married  person  may  differ  from  the  average  unmarried  one  in 
unobservable  ways  that  affect  labor  market  outcomes  too.  This  proxy  logic 
provides a further justification for some of the background variables introduced in 
my model-specifications. Thus, some control variables will be introduced more as 
proxies for unobserved background variables. Primary examples of such variables 
are education and sector of employment.20
The models above must be estimated somehow. In the data sets, the dependent 
variables have five possible values. Hence we have a limited dependent variable 
with a natural ordering, and ordered probit or logit estimation suggests itself. 21 The 
practical differences between logit and probit seem small  (Verbeek, 2012:419), 
and I will use ordered logit. Such models are not straightforward to interpret in 
themselves  (Wooldridge,  2009:536ff).  Moreover,  the  estimated  effects  are 
sensitive to the values of all variables in the model. For example, the change in 
probability of holding a certain view due to a change in income (a marginal effect) 
would vary with one's starting income, but also with the values of other variables, 
for instance one's education. Thus, all other variables must be held constant (at 
substantially meaningful values), and an enormous amount of alternatives present 
themselves. The preferred solution is to, for each respondent, compute the change 
in probability of being in a certain left-right position associated with going from 
tenancy to ownership given the respondent-specific values of all other variables. I 
then average these probability changes. This yields the average marginal effect on 
the probabilities of any left-right position associated with switching from renting 
to owning (Verbeek, 2012:209; Greene, 2012:736ff; cf. Duch & Stevenson, 2006; 
admittedly, a tenure form switch is not marginal, but this is the term).
A less assumption-laden alternative to logit models is the linear probability 
model (LPM), which amounts to using standard ordinary least squares (OLS). It 
gives  constant  marginal  effects  at  mean  values  of  the  independent  variables 
(Angrist  &  Pischke,  2009:105ff).  Moreover,  with  five  possible  values,  the 
19Doling & Ford (2007:125; cf. Jones et al, 2007:137) argue that owning a home in a declining labor market area,  
where price levels (and increases) are comparatively low, could increase demand for redistribution if the homes 
have lock-in effects. General lock-in effects are claimed to exist in Sweden in Boverket (2014b). Maybe this  
would translate into an association between homeownership and a move leftwards on the left-right scale in such 
areas. No such association will be found below.
20This reasoning should not justify any control variable. In my case, the variables I will consider are all common 
in  the  literature  (cf.  for  instance  Berglund  & Oskarson,  2012;  Iversen  &  Soskice,  2001).  Many  relate  to  
background variables mentioned in the theory chapter.
21Logit models require distributional assumptions about the error term (Verbeek, 2012:211f, 217ff). It is hard to  
assess  how  important  the  fulfillment  of  these  assumptions  really  are.  For  the  mathematical  proofs  of  the 
estimators, they are of course indispensable. But if the world is characterized by patterns rather than by laws (at  
least given our present level of knowledge), the lack of exact fit between formulas and the world should be less 
of a problem: we use approximately sustainable techniques to evaluate a world that is inherently hard to fix.
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dependent  variable  can  be  argued  to  be  approximately  continuous  (Teorell  & 
Svensson,  2007:109ff).  This  means  that  OLS results  can be interpreted  as  the 
point  move  on  the  left-right  scale  associated  with  switching  from tenancy  to 
ownership. I apply this latter reasoning when exploring interactions between class 
groups  and  homeownership  below,  since  this  avoids  calculating  a  quite  large 
amount  of  marginal  effects.  For  the  rest  of  the  results,  I  have  estimated  both 
ordered logit and LPM. The substantive conclusions remain the same.
3.4 Remaining Concerns
Any research design has strengths and limitations. In this section I first discuss the 
fact that an extensive study in itself does not explore individual observations in-
depth,  which means that  the method may be less suitable  to really understand 
meanings and perceptions (cf. Teorell & Svensson, 2007:ch. 10). This observation 
leads to some general assumptions I deem appropriate to make for the survey data 
research design to be convincing. I then discuss two factors that could mar any 
particular statistical  study.  This concerns omitted variable  bias, i.e.  unobserved 
variables  which,  if  captured,  would  alter  the  results.  It  also  concerns  the 
possibility of reverse causality, i.e. that political views influence tenure form. 
What is captured by studying survey responses on left-right orientation? Just 
because answers are quantified in questionnaires, it is evident that survey material 
is not more exact. It is better to think of survey data as more classifiable than 
interviews  in-depth.  That  is,  the  survey question-answer itself  is  by definition 
more easily measured and then compared to other answers, but the meaning of the 
measurement  in an individual case may be less clear (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 
2013a:179). As long as the purpose is to reveal systematic differences this should 
be less of an issue. Regarding specific preferences, it is even possible that they are 
tapped into in a more valid manner with survey material,  since the respondent 
really has to choose a preferred option. Regarding left-right position, I know of no 
recent study that discusses what Swedes really have in mind when they think of 
this.  Mair  (2007) states  that  the  concepts  of  left  and right  may hold different 
meanings over time and space. Within one country at one particular point in time 
this should be less of an issue. In all instances, the left-right scale seems to be 
considered  meaningful  by  Swedes  (ibid),  and  left-right  position  captures 
fundamental  political  orientations  on  a  dimension  that  mirrors  issues  which 
structure Swedish (welfare state) politics and concern fundamental views on how 
society should be (ibid; Berglund & Oskarson, 2010; cf. Mair, 2007).22 Similarly, 
the  meaning  of  the  response-options  used  should  be  reasonably  clear  to 
respondents as they concern comparatively well-known political  issues of high 
salience (cf. Esaiasson et al, 2012:243). That being said, there is probably scope 
for  interesting  research  on  how  left-right  position  relates  to  (lived)  political 
identities.
22To denote these fundamental views I prefer the term  orientation  to  ideology, since the latter could suggest 
questionable assumptions of thought-outness. 
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I  find  the  requirements  for  survey  data  analysis  to  hold  to  be  relatively 
innocent, especially as my focus is on salient political issues in one country in a 
short period of time. It must probably be assumed that people in general have a 
similar world in mind when they answer questions, and that those who answer it 
in  different  ways  do  not  systematically  differ  in  their  understanding  of  that 
question.  Evidently,  it  cannot  be  allowed  that  people  answer  questions  in  a 
completely random fashion. But the fact that survey responses on different items 
normally correlate in theoretically meaningful ways suggest the existence of non-
random patterns which are often successfully revealed (but see Ionnidis, 2005). It 
still  allows  people to  hold complex,  even contradictory views,  the  salience  of 
which systematically depends on circumstances. Still, the analysis will of course 
be  sensitive  to  the  probability  that  certain  respondents  might  have  been quite 
indifferent between some alternatives, and that results could have been slightly 
different  (but not necessarily more or less true) if  a sufficient  amount  of final 
choices had been set to a neighboring alternative. Still, if a general trend exists, it 
should be discernible regardless of such concerns.
I now turn to questions of bias. Here, it is important to recognize a difference 
between types  of  biases:  a  bias that  exaggerates  a  connection  is  usually  more 
serious than the reverse. In the first case a zero-relationship could be misreported 
as an existing connection,  while in the latter  case we get a lower bound. (The 
lower  bound could  of  course  be  indistinguishable  from zero,  which  leaves  us 
agnostic  about the existence of a relationship).  Three potential  sources of bias 
could be of concern here. Taken together, they suggest a potential downards bias.
Firstly, data do not ask about one's net, or real, ownership. A homeowner will 
probably have borrowed money,  which could affect the net financial  value,  or 
significance, of the house. I would argue that this should reduce any (economic) 
effect of homeownership on preferences, since the house provides less equity and 
less (potential) independence, at least in the short run. Ansell (2014:386f) reasons 
this way in his panel data model.23 In a cross-sectional model such as mine, this 
mitigation should be less severe if it is averaged out over homeowners, some of 
whom may have had time to pay back loans. In a possibly extreme case, if home-
ownership works through (ideological) notions of ontological independence only, 
incurred debt should not affect preferences at all.
Secondly,  would ownership of  a  second home,  such as  a  summer  cottage, 
influence the estimated effect? One could assume a limit to how ownership affects 
preferences, where going from zero to one house is more important than going 
from one to two houses. This would imply an underestimation of the relationship 
(the homeownership dummy then misses that some already own a summer-house 
which would make some tenants more like homeowners while homeowners who 
own summer-houses are less affected). Furthermore, one could assume that one's 
main house affects preferences more than one's secondary residence, at least at 
constant  house  quality  and  value.  But  it  must  be  recognized  that  different 
interaction effects, like the effect of becoming the owner of a home when you 
already own another home, are unclear, and it is easy to imagine several cross-
23It is somewhat interesting that Andersson et al (2007) find that homeowners see paying off loans (but perhaps 
not interest) as paying money to themselves. This would perhaps alleviate the bias.
25
effects of varying and contingent strength. Dunleavy (1979) assumes an additive 
effect of unspecified size of multiple ownerships. Saunders (1990) argues that this 
is theoretically unmotivated, but proposes no alternative. Conley & Gifford (2006) 
argue  that  summer-house  ownership  attenuates  the  difference  between  home-
owners and tenants according to the marginal effects reasoning. In section 4.1.1, I 
find  that  summer-house  ownership  does  attenuate  the  relationship  between 
homeownership and left-right position.  I argue that it  is hard to know what to 
make of this.
One last bias could occur if past homeowners sold their house and moved into 
tenancy (cf. Kemeny,  2005a:71), if the effect of homeownership works via the 
financial  resources  it  provides.  These  homeowners  would  realize  the  financial 
value of their houses, and thus their political preferences may still be linked to the 
(economic value of past) homeownership.
The main hypothesis is that homeownership has an independent influence on 
left-right  orientation.  But  what  about  reverse  causality,  i.e.  that  left-right 
orientation  influences  (the  probability  of)  homeownership?  To  explore  a 
theoretical  connection that has not been empirically established, this  should be 
less of an issue. But the findings could be less interesting if they merely suggested 
that people with a certain type of political orientation get into homeownership. 
Except possibly Kemeny (2005a; b), both the theoretical and empirical literature 
mostly ignores this. Neither is the argument addressed that people with certain 
types of preferences would tend to choose homes that could be more expected to 
rise in value. Saunders (1990:235f) does make an empirically supported argument 
that people get into homeownership because they want to own for other reasons 
(and  I  do  not  set  out  to  explain  tenure  form  preferences)  and  that  political 
preferences may change after that: Voters who bought their homes in 1980 voted 
Conservative in 1979 not because of their political orientation but because they 
wanted to buy. Arguably, reverse causality is controlled for (partially) either by 
controlling  for  background  factors  like  income  that  should  account  for  such 
preferences,  or  by comparing  among  groups with different  party affiliation  or 
baseline preferences.
Finally,  tenure  choices  are  structurally  constrained.  Thus  preferences 
themselves hardly allows tenure choice, at least not controlling for variables such 
as income, class and education, and in that case the direction should rather be in 
the  theorized  way.  Additionally,  unobserved  factors  such  as  personality  and 
genetic heritage working through predisposed ideological affinities are suggested 
to matter for preferences. But no determinism is suggested (Alford et al, 2005; 
Kandler  et  al,  2012).  Still,  I  recognize that  causality  could run both ways (cf. 
Kitschelt  &  Rehm,  2014).  In  this  case,  homes  would  still  allow  for  some 
predisposed  owners  to  achieve  cognitive  assonance  between  life-world  and 
preferences,  and  perhaps  have  a  reinforcing  effect  on  them,  while  potentially 
influencing other owners too. I will not be able to arbiter between the directions of 
causality.  I  maintain  that  the  findings  are  of  interest  even  if  causation  is 
reciprocal, and emphasize that a pattern consistent with the egotropic mechanism 
would suggest a causal effect.
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4 Homeownership and Left-Right 
Orientation
I now apply the proposed methods in order to investigate the relationship between 
homeownership and left-right orientation as well as issue preferences and party 
preferences. The first section explores left-right orientation. Thereafter, I exploit 
price variations to investigate if a pattern consistent with an egotropic mechanism 
is found. Then, specific relationships according to class-group or party support are 
explored. Finally,  I consider more specific issue preferences relating to welfare 
state  policies,  and party preferences.  All  estimations  are  done using  Stata  13. 
Results not shown are of course available. 
4.1 Main Results
Here  I  answer  the  hypothesis  that  homeownership  is  related  to  left-right 
orientation in the sense that it is associated with a more rightist orientation. As 
dependent  variable  I  use  left-right  self-placement  (lrpos),  as  answered  by the 
question “It is sometimes said that political views may be placed on a left-right 
scale. Where would you place yourself on such a scale?”.24 Five alternatives are 
possible, “clearly to the left”, “somewhat to the left”, “neither to the left nor to the 
right”, “somewhat to the right”, and “clearly to the right”. Answers are coded with 
values 1-5. Thus higher values takes us rightwards. The sample distribution of 
answers is given in Table 4.1. It is quite symmetric, the middle position being the 
most common. 
My  independent  variable  is  a  homeownership  dummy,  the  answer  to  the 
question “[d]o you or someone in your household own your current home?”. It is 
good that the question is asked at the household level. For instance, the situation 
of a spouse may influence life circumstances (cf. Margalit, 2013:91; Rehm et al, 
2012:394;  Lynch  & Myrskylä,  2009:1080).  The share of  validly coded home-
owners  in  the  sample  is  73%, as  opposed to  around 66% in Sweden in  2012 
(Statistics Sweden d). 
Table 4.1. Sample distribution of left-right orientation
Left-right 
position
Clearly to 
the left
Somewhat to 
the left
Neither to the left 
nor to the right
Somewhat to 
the right
Clearly to 
the right
Frequency 619 1,456 1,826 1,555 629
Percent 10.2 23.9 30.0 25.6 10.3
Source: SOM 2012
24All translations are mine. The data reference links to the codebook. 
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Table 4.2. Tenure form differences in average left-right orientation
Homeowners (n=4310) Tenants (n=1612)
Average left-right position 3.12 2.75
Confidence interval 3.09-3.15 2.7-2.8
Source: SOM 2012
I  start  by  illustrating  the  relationship  between  tenure  form  and  left-right 
position in Table 4.2. It gives the average left-right position of homeowners and 
tenants. The difference may seem small in the sense that both homeowners and 
tenants are positioned quite close to the middle. But since most respondents place 
themselves  in  a  middle  category,  it  remains  noteworthy,  and  the  confidence 
intervals do not overlap.
Column 1 in Table 4.3 renders the bivariate relationship from Table 4.2 in 
terms  of  ordered  logistic  regression.  The  figures  themselves  are  not  very 
meaningful. As mentioned in section 3.3, the interpretive focus is on the marginal 
effects which I present further down. Here, only the significance and sign should 
be retained; the positive sign in column 1 implies a higher probability of home-
owners placing themselves more to the right and less to the left than tenants. 
In  columns  2 to  4 I  add control  variables  to  see if  the relationship  holds. 
Column 2 adds income (all  sources). Just  like homeownership,  the question is 
asked  at  the  household  level.  Household  income  is  given  by SOM in  twelve 
categories from 100,000 SEK or below; 101,000 to 200,000 SEK; etc., up to one 
1,100,000 or more (the sample median is between 400,000 and 500,000, thus one 
category  higher  than  the  Swedish  median  in  2012;  Statistics  Sweden  f).  As 
expected, the relationship weakens when adding income.
In column 3, I add a control for objective class-position (I call these  class  
controls throughout the analysis).25 SOM codes the respondents as belonging to a 
class  based  on  her  or  his  (last)  occupation,  including  employers.  I  use  the 
European ESeC (European socioeconomic Classification) schema, a revision of 
the widely used class schema developed by Goldthorpe and Erikson (Bengtsson, 
2012:13; see also ISER). It builds on the insight that the old vertical working class 
versus middle class dichotomy is too crude for understanding social divisions in 
contemporary welfare states. It is more fine-grained vertically, and even involves 
some  horizontal  divisions.  (Horizontal  divisions  are  often  seen  to  uncover 
differences  in  political  orientations  between  groups  in  similar  vertical  class 
positions; Oesch 2006a, b; 2008; Lubbers & Güveli,  2007; Güveli  et  al  2007; 
Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014; though ESeC would probably not suffice if the goal was 
to uncover these differences). The omitted baseline category is “other workers”: 
semi- and unskilled workers in routine non-service occupations.
In column 4 I add the full set of control variables (henceforth I denote these 
other controls). Foremost, this includes a dummy for being retired. As retirees are 
more likely to place themselves to the right, and more likely to own their house, 
they account for much of the difference between columns 3 and 4. Other variables 
are more of a usual suspects character, some of them may relate to both tenure 
form and left  right orientation,  but they may also proxy correlated unobserved 
characteristics of importance. Education is a four-step dummy with low education 
25I have considered including subjective class-position also. Such a variable changes nothing substantial.
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Table 4.3. The relationship between homeownership and left-right orientation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Lrpos Lrpos Lrpos lrpos
Homeownership 0.573*** 0.351*** 0.357*** 0.329***
(0.0525) (0.0579) (0.0605) (0.0717)
Household income 0.127*** 0.118*** 0.165***
(0.00951) (0.0106) (0.0140)
Higher grade professionals and large 
employers
0.675***
(0.0999)
0.645***
(0.121)
Lower grade professionals 0.274*** 0.396***
(0.0880) (0.110)
Other higher grade white collar workers 0.445***
(0.0997)
0.587***
(0.117)
Small employers, and self-employed 
(non-farmers)
1.147***
(0.127)
0.832***
(0.150)
Farmers, etc. 1.447*** 0.957***
(0.265) (0.342)
Lower supervisory workers and 
technicians
0.461***
(0.121)
0.516***
(0.135)
Lower services, sales and clerical 
workers
0.226**
(0.0911)
0.409***
(0.108)
Skilled technical and manual workers -0.0386
(0.115)
-0.0424
(0.130)
Retired 0.206**
(0.0809)
Lower middle education 0.123
(0.0900)
Higher middle education 0.166*
(0.0992)
Higher education 0.133
(0.109)
Private sector 0.432***
(0.0645)
Union member -0.677***
(0.0619)
Unemployed -0.129
(0.174)
Male 0.0266
(0.0629)
Couple -0.348***
(0.0756)
Own children 0.195***
(0.0723)
Nordic 0.446**
(0.198)
Europe 0.0973
(0.164)
World -0.00105
(0.186)
Smaller town -0.207**
(0.0941)
City -0.0462
(0.0831)
Stockholm/Gothenburg/Malmö -0.158
(0.104)
Observations 5,922 5,518 5,198 4,287
Note: Question wording: “It is sometimes said that political views may be placed on a left-right 
scale. Where would you place yourself on such a scale?”. Ordered logit estimation. Standard 
errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: SOM 2012.
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being  the  reference  category.26 Further  labor  market  control  variables  include 
dummies  for  private  sector  employment  (workers  in  the  public  or  non-profit 
sector are omitted), unemployment and union membership. Furthermore, I control 
for whether the respondent is in a couple and has children or not.27 I also control 
for where in the world the respondent was raised, which is the closest the data 
allow us to get to migration status or even ethnicity. The categories include being 
raised  in  a  Nordic  country,  another  European  country,  or  a  country  outside 
Europe. Having been raised in Sweden is the omitted category. Lastly, in line with 
section 3.3, I include an urban/rural variable in four categories coded by SOM, 
with countryside residents as reference group.
The homeownership dummy remains significant in the full model in column 4. 
This  indicates  that  the  hypothesized  relationship  between  homeownership  and 
left-right orientation in Sweden exists. Homeownership is indeed associated with 
more rightist political views. Moreover, the homeownership coefficient remains 
fairly  stable  in  columns  2 to  4.  The relative  insensitivity  of  the coefficient  in 
columns 2 to 4 in Table 4.3 is reassuring, since it suggests that the results are 
robust.  To appreciate  the results  below, it  may be worth referring back to  the 
figure in column 4 in order to assess if other more group-specific associations 
between homeownership and left right orientation are relatively weak or strong 
compared to this general relationship. 
I now turn to the more meaningful average marginal effects.  These are the 
average  effects  associated  with  changing  from  tenancy  to  ownership  on  the 
probability of placing oneself in a given left-right position among the observed 
individuals in the data. I report them in Table 4.4.
Table 4 shows that homeownership in general is associated with an average 
absolute probability increase of placing oneself more to the right, and less to the 
left,  of roughly between 3.0 and 4.0 percent  (I  will  mostly ignore  the middle 
position when I present other marginal effects in the text). It can be of value to 
compare these marginal effects with the marginal effects of a variable that is more 
commonly analyzed in the literature (cf. Ansell, 2014; Rehm, 2011; Kitschelt & 
Rehm, 2014). Given the egotropic notion that one’s private economic situation 
matters,  household  income  is  a  natural  reference  point.  The  rough  average 
marginal  effects  of  going  from  201,000-300,000  to  301,000-400,000,  from 
301,000-400,000  to  401,000-500,000  and  from  401,000-500,000  to  501,000-
600,000 in yearly household SEK income (these are probably the most common 
and relevant changes) are tightly bounded around a 2 percent increase (decrease) 
in  the probability  of placing oneself  to  the right  (to the left)  for any outcome 
category. In terms of household yearly income differences,  the average marginal 
effect  of  tenure  form  on  left-right  orientation  corresponds  roughly  to  the 
difference between earning 301,000-400,000 and 501,000-600,000. This is 
26It  may  be  argued  that  I  should  also  control  for  educational  orientation  in  order  to  capture  horizontally 
systematic  differences  in  predispositions  towards  different  orientations.  As  mentioned,  such  horizontal 
differentiations often capture differences between people in similar vertical positions. Introducing a control for  
educational orientation according to whether the education indicates an interpersonal, technical or administrative 
logic (loosely following Oesch 2006a, b) gives a homeownership coefficient of 0.38***. But I lose some 750 
observations.   
27Controlling for number of children in household changes nothing. But I lose ca 3,000 observations.
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Table 4.4. Average marginal effect on probability of left-right orientation associated with 
homeownership
Left-right 
orientation
Clearly to 
the left
Somewhat to 
the left
Neither to the 
left or right
Somewhat to 
the right
Clearly to 
the right
Homeownership 
vs. tenancy
-2.9%***
(0.0063)    
-3.9%***
(0.0085)
-0.1%**
(0.0009)
3.9%***
(0.0086)
3.0%***
(0.0065)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: SOM 2012
certainly  a  considerable  change  in  circumstances  for  households  within  these 
income brackets. 
Admittedly, if we are interested in assessing whether the relationship is large 
or small,  the above comparison is only somewhat helpful. But I stress that the 
question guiding the thesis concerns a hitherto overlooked relationship between 
homeownership and political orientation in Sweden, not its size. Furthermore, I 
maintain that it is more interesting to explore if the strength of the relationship 
shows any theoretically meaningful variation. The marginal effects in Table 4.4 
can serve as a reference point to get an idea of whether the effects are relatively 
strong or weak in different areas or groups. I explore these variations below.28 But 
first, I address the issue of summer-house ownership that I discussed in section 
3.4.   
4.1.1 Summer-House Ownership as a Potential Confounder
SOM asks if the respondent or anyone in her or his household owns a summer 
house. Including a summer house dummy in column 4 of Table 4.3 (not shown) 
attenuates the relationship.  The homeownership dummy coefficient  is  0.216**. 
The summerhouse  dummy coefficient  itself  is  insignificant.  It  remains  unclear 
what all of this means in terms of bias and interpretation. Statistically, the number 
of observations is cut to 1,960 and a high degree of correlation between home-
ownership and summer homeownership is obvious. Futhermore, if I replace the 
retirement dummy with a control for age and age squared, the homeownership 
coefficient is strengthened – retirement correlates highly with homeownership and 
with summer home ownership, and retirees are more likely to place themselves to 
the  right.  But  foremost,  the  meaning  of  controlling  for  a  second  home  when 
investigating  the relationship  between homeownership  and political  orientation 
and  preferences  is  unclear,  as  would  be  the  implications  of  constructing  an 
ownership  index  (cf.  Saunders,  1990).  For  these  reasons,  I  keep  to  the  more 
theoretically grounded relationship between ownership of one's primary home and 
political views.
28These variations include differences according to class and party preferences. I have explored a third variation 
mentioned in the theory chapter  which was suggested  by Kemeny and Ansell,  namely that  homeownership 
should have specific right-wing effects on retirees. I leave these results out. In no model or specification do I  
find any retiree-specific relationship. As retirees are already relatively rightist-oriented, perhaps a ceiling effect  
explains this. 
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4.2 Regional Variation
I now test the hypothesis that the relationship between homeownership and a more 
rightist  orientation  is  stronger  when  house-values  are  higher  as  suggested  in 
Ansell  (2014)  (arguably,  one’s  preferences  will  be  affected  by  house-prices 
mainly if one is a homeowner, a claim I test soon). The general mechanism here 
relates to the assumption of egotropy,  i.e.  that private economic circumstances 
matter for political preferences, and that a better private economic situation makes 
one  more  skeptical  of  welfare  state  intervention  in  market  outcomes.  Results 
consistent with a theorized mechanism would at least partially address concerns 
for spuriosity, and arguably even reverse causality. 
I  thus  consider  regional  house-price  variations  in  Sweden  and  employ  a 
similar method as Ansell (2014) does for the US. A few alternatives are possible, 
and I will attempt them all, arguing that they should yield similar indications and 
thus  affirm the  robustness  of  the  results.  I  first  consider  how the  relationship 
differs between major city areas and other regions. Generally,  the former areas 
drive the trend of price increases and account for most of the highest price-levels 
(Statistics  Sweden e;  cf. Boverket,  2014a). For ease of interpretation,  I follow 
Ansell (2014) and Margalit  (2013) and split the sample and estimate the same 
models for those respondents who live in a major city area and those who do not. 
The coding is made clear by Statistics Sweden (g). I present estimates based on 
the municipality assignment prior to 2005, as the definition of major urban areas 
was changed this year so as to include very large areas (results are similar if I use 
the  post-2005  coding,  however).  Homeowners  in  major  city  areas  are  1,452 
(70.1%) and renters  are  619.  Homeowners  outside  major  city  areas  are  2,964 
(73.9%) and renters are 1,047.      
Results  are  presented in  Table 4.5.  It  is  seen that  the relationship between 
homeownership  and left-right  orientation is  stronger  both in terms of size and 
significance in major city areas. Thus, the relationship between homeownership 
and  left-right  position  is  driven  by  the  difference  between  homeowners  and 
tenants in major cities. Calculating marginal effects shows an absolute probability 
change of placing oneself more to the right or less to the left of around 4.5-6% in 
major city areas (p-values below 0.000) and around 1-2% outside these (p-values 
around 0.05). An obvious difference is that homeownership should have another 
financial meaning in major cities, where prices are higher. Hence the relationship 
follows price variations as predicted.29 To further assess this, in both ordered logit 
and OLS regressions on tenants only (not shown), a dummy for living in major 
city areas is insignificant. The fact that a price relationship is absent where it 
29Inspired by Tiebout (1956) one may reason that homeownership has a different (financial) meaning in major 
city areas because people here (for  other reasons) vote for politicians who conduct policies which raise the 
values of homes more.  In  that  case I have a potential  endogeneity problem. I may partially capture this by 
controlling for party preferences (a dummy for each major political party – SOM does not ask about municipal  
parties – although this variable is more often thought of as affected by left-right position than vice versa). If I do  
this, homeownership coefficient is insignificantly different from zero in column 2, but still 0.318** in column 1.  
Naturally, standard errors are high.  
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Table 4.5. Regional price variations.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Lrpos outside 
major city areas
Lrpos inside 
Major city areas
Homeownership 0.178** 0.532***
(0.0906) (0.119)
Household income 0.147*** 0.187***
0.178** 0.532***
Class controls Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes
Observations 2,808 1,479
Note: Question wording: “It is sometimes said that political views 
may  be  placed  on  a  left-right  scale.  Where  would  you  place 
yourself  on  such  a  scale?”.  Ordered  logit  estimation.  Standard 
errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: SOM 2012. For regional coding, see Statistics Sweden e. 
should be strengthens the plausibility of the results and suggests that my model is 
reasonable.   
It is possible to exploit price variations in a possibly even more detailed way. 
Two options present themselves: To look for different relationships according to 
county differences in cooperative apartment-prices and according to municipality 
differences in detached house-prices. At the most detailed level, the municipality, 
Boverket  (2014a)  claims  that  there  are  only  reliable  data  on  owned  detached 
housing. Unfortunately SOM does not ask if the owner lives in a detached house 
or in a cooperative flat,  and it  is  not possible to separate  out owned detached 
housing from cooperative flats in a convincing way. But I make the assumption 
that  (relative)  prices  for  cooperative  flats  and  detached  houses  are  highly 
correlated. I then code respondents according to if they lived in a municipality 
where  mean  purchase  prices  for  detached  houses  were  above  4  million  SEK, 
between 2 and 4 million SEK, between 1 and 2 million SEK and below 1 million 
SEK in 2012. 
Results are presented in panel A of Table 4.6. It suggests a similar variation 
according to prices as in Table 4.5.  Column 4 in Table 4.6A mainly captures 
Stockholm characteristics. In Stockholm, the association between homeownership 
and  left-right  position  is  the  strongest,  and  its  inhabitants  may  drive  the 
relationship to a large extent (the marginal effects here range between 6 and 9% 
with p-values below 0.000). It is fruitful to compare columns 2 and 3. Arguably, 
in these two columns, we compare a large set of municipalities while excluding 
the  somewhat  particular  Stockholm area,  as  well  as  some  sparsely  populated 
municipalities (column 1) where the relative difference in economic conditions 
may be quite large as compared to the difference between the municipalities in 
columns 2 and 3. Moreover, there are more observations for these two groups 
(and hence lower standard errors). Calculating average marginal effectsyields an 
insignificant change in the probability of placing oneself more to the right or less 
to the left due to tenure form for column 2, but a highly significant change in of 
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Table 4.6. More regional price variations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
(Detached house-
prices on 
municipality 
level)
Lrpos
Prices < 1 
million
Lrpos
Prices > 1 
million and 
< 2 million
Lrpos
Prices > 2 million 
and
< 4 million
Lrpos
Prices > 4 
million
Homeownership 0.272 0.123 0.390*** 0.718***
(0.178) (0.150) (0.110) (0.195)
Household income 0.164*** 0.138*** 0.160*** 0.198***
(0.0376) (0.0295) (0.0216) (0.0368)
Class controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 822 1,136 1,728 536
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B 
(Cooperative flat 
prices on county 
level)
Lrpos
Prices < 1 
million
Lrpos
Prices > 1 
million and 
< 2 million
Lrpos
Prices > 2 million
Homeownership 0.216* 0.354*** 0.492***
(0.111) (0.124) (0.157)
Household income 0.142*** 0.166*** 0.185***
(0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0294)
Class controls Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,865 1,497 860
Note: Question wording: “It is sometimes said that political views may be placed on a left-right  
scale. Where would you place yourself on such a scale?”. Ordered logit estimation. Standard errors 
in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: SOM 2012. For regional coding, see Boverket 2014a:18 (Panel A) and Statistics Sweden e 
(Panel B).  
around 3-5% in column 3 (p-values of  0.001 or below).
In Panel B of Table 4.6 I consider a difference on the county-level according 
to sold, not-new, cooperative apartment mean prices given by Statistics Sweden 
(e). They emphasize that conclusions on price developments should not be drawn 
from their data, since housing quality is not considered. Still, I use the differences 
in levels in 2012 (which naturally correlate with differences in price evolutions). I 
consider the relationship between homeownership and left-right position in the 
Stockholm county where mean prices are above 2 million SEK (column 3), the 
counties of Halland, Gotland, Skåne, Västra Götaland and Uppland where mean 
prices are between 1 and 2 million SEK (column 2) and remaining counties where 
mean prices are below 1 million SEK (column 1). Once more, the relationship 
follows the increase in prices as I hypothesized.
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4.3 Class Differences
I  now  explore  if  the  relationship  between  homeownership  and  left-right 
orientation  is  driven  by  any  particular  class  group,  and  if  there  are  any 
hypothesized cross-pressure effects as suggested by Dunleavy (1979). Of course, 
there is no reason not to consider the relationship between homeownership and 
left-right orientation in all classes. Here, it is convenient to keep all group-specific 
relationships within one model, since the number of observations in some groups 
naturally is much lower than the number of observations in the whole sample. 
Following Brambor et al (2006), I omit the constant term and include a dummy 
for each of the nine class groups, as well as an interaction between each class-
group and homeownership.  I  then estimate  OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors (Angrist & Pischke, 2009:91). Results are presented in Table 4.7.
The  plain  class  coefficients  give  the  relationship  between  left-right  self-
placement and a particular class-group when the homeownership dummy is zero, 
i.e. for renters within that class-group. The interaction term coefficients explore 
whether homeownership alters this relationship in a significant manner. It does so 
for three groups, and in each case it moves the relationship further to the right on 
the left-right scale. Hence, class-wise, the relationship between homeownership 
and left-right orientation is driven by lower grade professionals and other higher 
grade white collar workers. These are quite large electoral groups (25% of the 
sample). Admittedly, the relationship is the strongest among farmers. For them, 
homeownership is associated with an entire step forwards. But since farmers are 
few it is probably less noteworthy in terms of potential social relevance. 
What does Table 4.7 suggest about hypothesized cross-pressure? Especially 
lower grade professionals may be under cross-pressure. Tenants within this class-
group are among those who, on average, are the furthest to the left  (cf. Berglund 
&  Oskarson,  2012).  But  all  else  equal,  homeownership  within  this  group  is 
associated with a move half a step further to the right on the five-step left-right 
position scale, from 2.2 to 2.7. For other higher grade white collar workers, the 
associated move is from 2.5 to 2.8. As opposed to farmers, who also seem to be 
under cross-pressure, these white collar groups account for a rather large share of 
the  electorate.  Among  other  groups  of  workers  where  cross-pressure  was 
plausible, homeownership does not appear to matter. Thus, homeownership may 
not account for a (presumed) full loosening up of contemporary class loyalties. 
But clear class-group variations are uncovered, and an analysis of class groups 
and political views should probably consider tenure form.   
Note that homeownership is associated with a self-placement further to the 
right on the left-right scale, but not necessarily far to the right (recall that a value 
of 3 indicates a position neither to the left or right). This was suggested already in 
Table 4.1. But even if homeownership does not entail a right-wing position  per 
se,  it  may imply less amenability  to leftist  policies.  Naturally,  the relationship 
between homeownership and a class-group would be rather uninteresting if there
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Table 4.7. Class position variations
VARIABLES Lrpos
Higher grade professionals and large 
employers*homeownership
0.165
(0.113)
Lower grade professionals* homeownership 0.492***
(0.0888)
Other higher grade white collar
workers* homeownership
0.224**
(0.111)
Small employers, and self-employed (non-
farmers)*homeownership
0.217
(0.185)
Farmers, etc.*homeownership 0.984**
(0.443)
Lower supervisory workers and 
technicians*homeownership
0.192
(0.148)
Lower services, sales and clerical 
workers*homeownership
0.143
(0.0882)
Skilled workers*homeownership 0.0772
(0.146)
Non-skilled workers*homeownership -0.0585
(0.101)
Household income 0.0968***
(0.0083)
Higher grade professionals and large employers 2.599***
(0.136)
Lower grade professionals 2.203***
(0.118)
Other higher grade white collar workers 2.537***
(0.127)
Small employers, and self-employed (non-
farmers)
2.677***
(0.186)
Farmers, etc. 2.121***
(0.390)
Lower supervisory workers and technicians 2.513***
(0.153)
Lower services, sales and clerical workers 2.466***
(0.104)
Skilled workers 2.237***
(0.151)
Non-skilled workers 2.346***
(0.112)
Other controls Yes
Observations 4,287
R-squared 0.889
Note:  Question wording: “It  is sometimes said that  political  views 
may be placed on a left-right scale. Where would you place yourself 
on  such  a  scale?”.  OLS  regression.  Robust  standard  errors  in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: SOM 2012.   
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were no homeowners in that class-group.30 Among professionals and white collar 
workers, homeowners range between 75 and 81% in the sample. Among small 
employers and farmers, homeownership rates are 79 and 76% respectively, while 
it ranges between 63 and 73% among the rest. It should be kept in mind that the 
proportion of homeowners within each class-group is likely to be exaggerated to 
some extent.
4.4 Differences According to Party Preferences
Following Margalit (2013) and Karajda et al (2014), I now test the hypothesis that 
the relationship differs among groups with different party preferences. I do this by 
splitting the sample according to whether the respondent supported either a party 
in the right-wing government coalition or another parliamentary party in 2012. 
Without denying the existence of party block switchers, this should yield a split 
according to whether  people are already  relatively more supportive of market-
liberal welfare state policies on average. Preferably, baseline preferences should 
be  captured  by  even  more  underlying  ideological  notions,  or  by  left-right 
placement at an earlier period (splitting the sample according to current left-right 
placement  imposes  a  restriction  on  the  possible  relationship).  I  lack  such 
information, but based on Oscarsson & Holmberg (2013a), I argue that the left-
right dimension is of great importance for Swedish party choice.  
I  estimate  ordered  logit  and  present  the  results  in  Table  4.8.  While  the 
relationship between homeownership and left-right orientation is insignificantly 
different  from  zero  among  those  who  preferred  a  party  in  the  right-wing 
government coalition in 2012, it is significant among non-government supporters. 
The average marginal effect for this group is a decrease in the probability of being 
to the left  between 1 and 3% and an increase of 3% in probability of placing 
oneself  in the middle (the albeit  marginal  effects on the probability of placing 
oneself to the right of the middle are in the order of 1% or smaller). All p-values 
are around 0.04. It is possible to further divide the two groups into residents in 
major city areas and residents outside these areas. I only present the one of these 
four relationships that is statistically significant: the homeownership coefficient 
among non-government supporters who live in major cities is 0.54. This translates 
into a decreased probability of placing oneself clearly to the left or somewhat to 
the left of 8 and 3% respectively, an increased probability in placing oneself in the 
middle of 7%, and increased probabilities in placing oneself somewhat or clearly 
to the right of 3 and 1% (p-values range between 0.01 and 0.001).31 
30Dunleavy (1979) finds that owning two cars and a home pushes a working class voter strongly towards the 
Conservatives. Saunders (1990) criticizes him for failing to note that such voters hardly existed.  
31Note that supporters of the Swedish Democrats are not grouped with government party supporters, although it  
is a right-wing party.  Doing this (not shown) yields a coefficient  of 0.2* in column 2 of Table 4.8 (1,1889 
observations). Their voters tend to place themselves to the right, but between the remaining opposition and the 
other right-wing parties.  Regarding specific  issues  pertaining to the left-right  scale,  these voters  hold views 
similar to leftist voters in some cases, and views similar to rightist voters in others (Oscarsson & Holmberg,  
2013a:227ff).  Interestingly,  if  they  are  excluded  from estimation  (not  shown),  the  homeownership  dummy 
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Table 4.8. Variations according to party preferences 
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Lrpos (right-wing 
government party 
sympathizers)
Lrpos (opposition 
party sympathizers)
Lrpos (opposition party 
sympathizers in major 
urban areas)
Homeownership 0.163 0.210** 0.542***
(0.129) (0.0996) (0.169)
Household income 0.0910*** 0.0394* 0.0941**
(0.0212) (0.0229) (0.0370)
Class controls Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,802 2,196 685
Note: Question wording: “It is sometimes said that political views may be placed on a left-right  
scale. Where would you place yourself on such a scale?”. Ordered logit estimation. Standard errors 
in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: SOM 2012.
Several  conclusions  can  be  made.  Firstly, the  hypothesis  of  a  difference 
between party block supporters is born out. Homeownership is associated with a 
move rightwards among left party supporters. This should foremost be interpreted 
as an increased likelihood of placing oneself in the middle on the left-right scale. 
Arguably,  Tables  4.7  and  4.8  capture  similar  tendencies  in  different  ways.  In 
Table 4.7, it is otherwise leftist-oriented class groups who are associated with a 
middle position due to homeownership. In Table 4.8 it is people who prefer non-
government parties. In line with this, the probability of placing oneself to the right 
of the middle for the respondents in column 2 of Table 4.8 naturally  remains 
smaller, although it is significant. Government party supporters, in turn, seem less 
sensitive to homeownership. This is probably due to the ceiling effect similar to 
the one Margalit (2013) registers. Lastly, the price variation appears again. This 
suggests  that  non-government  (mostly  left)  party  supporters  are  sensitive  to 
economic circumstances. 
4.5 Alternative Dependent Variables
My focus is on left-right orientation as a means to capture important underlying 
political views in Sweden. Still, it is worth exploring how homeownership relates 
to more specific issue preferences, some of which have been emphasized in the 
literature in section 2.3. They all pertain to welfare state policies and outcomes 
affected by these policies. Here, I also explore party preferences. As mentioned, 
these dependent variables correlate relatively strongly with left-right orientation in 
Sweden  in  general  (Oscarsson  &  Holmberg,  2013a:235ff),  but  recall  that  a 
discussion about how each particular  preference correlate  is beyond my scope. 
The correlation exists in SOM 2012 too. Naturally, it is not perfect. For instance, 
coefficient in column 3 is reduced to 0.46*** with 598 observations.
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specific information or experiences that relate to a particular issue may alter one's 
view on this  issue  without  causing  a  general  left-right  reorientation.  Hence  it 
should  be  expected  that  results  differ,  although  an  absence  of  any significant 
relationship would be worrying. I use the same model as above. 
4.5.1 Specific Issue Preferences
In  Table  4.9  below,  I  investigate  the  hypothesis  that  the  relationship  between 
homeownership and left-right orientation is reflected in preferences for welfare 
state-related issues. Panel A concerns issues that arguably are related to taxing 
and spending, and which have a pocketbook dimension. They concern questions 
of whether the public sector should be cut, if taxes should be cut, if the income 
gap should be reduced, if taxes should be raised rather than services cut, and if 
unemployment benefits should be raised. Higher values indicate support for a cut 
public sector and cut taxes, and skepticism towards a reduced income gap, raised 
taxes instead of cut services, and raised unemployment benefits. 
In panel B of Table 4.9 I explore issues which relate less to the size of the 
welfare state, and more to under what conditions welfare state services should be 
provided. In line with the more discourse-oriented scholars in section 3.2.1, these 
can  be  understood  as  tapping  into  a  person's  degree  of  market-friendliness 
regarding  the  production  and  delivery  of  welfare  state  services.  The  issues 
concern  private  schools,  private  care  for  the  elderly,  private  health  care  and 
whether  profits  should  be allowed  in  private  healthcare  and publicly  financed 
healthcare and education. Higher values means more favorability towards private 
supply of these services, more skepticism towards prohibiting profits in private 
health care, and less skepticism towards profits in tax financed care, education and 
healthcare. 
Detailed discussions about the results would be on thin ice since specific issue 
preference depend relatively more on factors outside my scope such as current 
debates,  perceptions  of  political  actors  and  local  circumstances  (Oscarsson  & 
Holmberg, 2013a: 367; again, this is a reason why it is preferable to focus upon 
the left-right scale). Still, the main relationship between homeownership and left-
right  orientation  reappears  in  some specific  preferences.  But  contrary  to  what 
Kemeny  (2005a)  and  the  discourse-oriented  researchers  might  suggest,  home-
ownership shows no relationship with preferencs for taxes and public sector size. 
However, homeowners disfavor a reduced income gap compared to tenants. This 
relationship is similar to that found by Ansell (2014) for Europe in terms of sign 
and significance.32 It is also seen that homeowners are more likely to think that 
raised unemployment benefits is a bad idea. These results may be consistent with 
the idea that homes as assets increase their  owners'  financial  independence,  as 
argued by Ansell (ibid). But differences between tenants and homeowners appear 
at least as clearly when it comes to attitudes towards private welfare services. It is 
not straightforward to link this to one's private economic situation. Perhaps it does 
suggest a more ideological relationship, too, where private ownership makes one
32But note that SOM does not ask if the income gap should be reduced by the government as in Ansell's study.
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Table 4.9. Homeownership and specific issue preferences. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A Cutps Cuttaxes Reduceincgap Taxesvsservice Raiseunemplbnft
Homeownership 0.0736 -0.0835 0.327** -0.107 0.406***
(0.0686) (0.137) (0.140) (0.147) (0.146)
Household 
income
0.0843*** 0.0591** 0.149*** 0.105*** 0.0840***
(0.0134) (0.0275) (0.0283) (0.0275) (0.0272)
Class controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,477 1,133 1,134 1,077 1,086
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)
Panel B Proprivate hc Propriveldcare Proprivschools Nohcprofits Noprofits
Homeownership 0.221*** 0.0346 0.330** 0.237* 0.0350
(0.0791) (0.146) (0.133) (0.138) (0.101)
Household 
income
0.0741*** 0.0546** 0.0813*** 0.113*** 0.0627***
(0.0153) (0.0265) (0.0262) (0.0275) (0.0191)
Class controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,433 1,079 1,228 1,135 2,260
Note: See appendix for question wording. Ordered logit estimation. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: SOM 2012
more market-friendly, as hypothesized by some analysts of asset-based welfare. 
But I will soon propose a somewhat different interpretation.
In Table 4.9, splitting the sample according to major city area as I do in Tables 
4.5 and 4.6 generally yields very small samples. But for preferences regarding a 
cut  public  sector  and  private  health  care,  the  strategy  can  be  attempted  (not 
shown). In both cases, the homeownership coefficient outside major city areas is 
insignificantly different from zero. But in major city areas (n = 1,456), the home-
ownership coefficient associated with the proposal to cut the size of the public 
sector is 0.24**. And regarding being in favor of increasing the share of privately 
run healthcare, the homeownership coefficient in major city areas (n = 1,116) is 
0.45***.  This  last  result  could suggest  that  an effect  of  private  ownership on 
market-friendliness  does  relate  to  house  values:  Hypothetically,  one  is  more 
inclined  to  hold  market-friendly  views  if  one's  personal  experience  of  other 
markets  is  positive.  These  reflections  would  benefit  from  research  which  is 
unfortunately beyond the current scope.
4.5.2 Party Preferences
Finally, I explore the hypothesis that the relationship between homeownership and 
left-right orientation is reflected in the relatively less underlying party 
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Table 4.10. Homeownership and party block preferences 
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Progovparty Progovparty
outside major 
city areas
Progovparty
inside major 
city areas
Homeownership 0.388*** 0.297** 0.525***
(0.0916) (0.118) (0.148)
Household income 0.201*** 0.187*** 0.210***
(0.0178) (0.0235) (0.0279)
Class controls Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,018 2,616 1,402
Note:  Question  wording:  “What  party  do  you  prefer  today?”  Binary  logit 
estimation. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: SOM 2012.
preferences.  In  particular,  I  investigate  if  homeownership  is  associated  with 
preferences for a party in the right-wing 2006-2014 government coalition, as this 
should capture  citizen  perceptions  about  how the  left-right  conflict  around the 
Swedish welfare state materializes (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2013a:234ff). This is 
done with binary logit estimation presented in Table 4.10. Column 1 gives the 
main relationship.  Everything else held constant,  homeowners  are  significantly 
more likely to prefer a party in the right-wing government coalition than tenants. 
The average marginal effect associated with homeownership on the probability of 
preferring a government party is 8% (p-values below 0.000). 
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.10, I split the sample according to whether the 
respondent lives in a major city area or not. The price pattern reappears. It is seen 
that the relationship varies some according to whether the respondent lives in a 
major city area or not. The difference in block party preferences between tenants 
and homeowners follows the predicted price pattern. The average marginal effect 
outside major city areas is 6% (p-values around 0.01). Inside them it is 11% (p-
values below 0.000). These are among the strongest marginal effects recovered in 
this  thesis.  Splitting  the  sample  according  to  municipal  detached  house-prices 
instead (not shown) unveils a pattern similar to the one in panel A in Table 4.6 
which is stronger than the pattern in columns 2 and 3 below.
To summarize the whole analysis, I do recover a relationship between home-
ownership  and  left-right  orientation  in  Sweden.  Homeownership  is  associated 
with a more rightwards, or perhaps better, a less leftwards, self-placement (recall 
that the relationship is driven by class groups who are pushed to the middle). The 
relationship remains under control for confounding factors, and seems insensitive 
to particular model choices. It is clear in terms of significance, and I will return to 
its size shortly. Arguably more important than the size of the main relationship, 
the  relationship  is  consistently  stronger  in  areas  were  house-prices  are 
comparatively high. Indeed, I find no relationship in low-price areas in the most 
detailed specification (Table 4.6A). It remains when I consider specific issue or 
block party preferences instead of left-right orientation. It also proves fruitful to 
look for different relationships in different groups. The results suggests that home-
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ownership may play its  most  substantial  role  in  pushing white  collar  or  other 
service worker groups in major urban areas further from the left, possibly because 
they live in areas where house values are the highest, and because the political 
orientation  of  already-right-oriented  people  is  somewhat  insensitive  to  home-
ownership due to a ceiling effect.
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5 Discussion
Below, I assess the general relationship and its plausibility. I also touch upon its 
size. I then consider the group-specific differences, and end with some political 
implications. Reflections on further research are interwoven throughout.
5.1 General Assessment
I  have  argued  that  homeownership  should  matter  for  left-right  orientation  in 
contemporary  Sweden and I  have  found that  this  is  so.  Homeownership  (and 
perhaps  also  the  ownership  of  other  less  widely  held  assets)  is  a  variable  to 
consider  in  contemporary  analyses  that  relate  political  views  or  vote  to 
socioeconomic  factors.  As  such,  it  really  is an  omitted  variable. I  further 
hypothesized that the relationship should follow the asset value of houses and 
found that higher values are associated with more rightist views of owners, just 
like  higher  incomes  are  associated  with  more  rightist  views  of  labor  market 
participants  (cf.  Berglund  & Oskarson,  2010).  The  price-pattern  reaffirms  the 
plausibility of the results. Another observation that reaffirms their plausibility is 
the  fact  that  Berglund  & Oskarson  (2010:192f)  find  that  the  seemingly  only 
independent relationship between objective class-position and left-right ideology 
concerns  small  employers.  They  propose  that  there  is  something  inherent  to 
ownership of businesses that orients one rightwards. By analogy, it may be that 
private  ownership  in  general  really  has  an  independent  effect  on  left-right 
orientation, perhaps by giving people an experience of markets. Once more, recall 
that housing probably is  the  most valuable financial asset to many, if not most, 
households (Boverket, 2009:6), and that households often expect prices to keep 
rising  even  when  such  expectations  could  be  perceived  as  irrational  (Ansell, 
2014:387).
For the causal theory, the fact that the relationship follows price variations in 
the predicted way is crucial. This pattern is clearly consistent with the notion that 
homeownership has an asset-aspect affecting economic circumstances which in 
turn  influence  political  orientations.  Indeed,  in  the  most  detailed  specification 
(Table  4.6A),  I  find  no  association  between  homeownership  and  left-right 
orientation in areas where prices are relatively low. The egotropic price pattern is 
robust to different types of regional coding and it is reaffirmed by the insensitivity 
of tenants to house-prices. Furthermore, it is not explained away by Stockholm 
idiosyncrasies (which in any case would not alter the substantive importance of 
my findings), which I discuss below in section 5.4. This reaffirms that there is 
something more general at work. 
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While egotropy served well, the theory of ontological independence has not 
been tested (I have hardly considered its testability or ways to relate it to egotropy 
in  a  mutually  exclusive  way).  Thus  there  is  no  real  room  for  comparisons. 
However, future research should investigate an analytical distinction inspired by 
the  results  in  Table  4.9.  It  is  seen that  a  difference  in  left-right  orientation  is 
reflected in differing views on some issue preferences.  A thorough analysis  of 
these  preferences  remains  beyond  my  scope,  but  the  left-right  orientation  of 
homeowners seems relatable to views on redistribution and some privatized, or 
marketized, welfare services rather than to issues of taxing, public sector size and 
welfare state services in general. One may distinguish between egotropy as the 
notion  that  the  private  economic  situation  matters  for  political  views,  and the 
notion that a positive experience of market  processes also matters for political 
views. I have not seen this distinction anywhere in the literature. My analysis has 
been inspired by the first notion as expressed both in studies on preferences and in 
the macro-relationship literature. But arguably, the results are at least as consistent 
with the second notion. 
I  have  stressed  that  egotropy  served  as  a  theoretical  link,  a  way  to 
conceptualize  a  mechanism. This retains  the causal  aspect  of the theory while 
steering clear of rationality and socialization which I argue would demand more 
space  and data  to  conceptualize  and operationalize.  It  would  be  interesting  to 
consider survey questions that tap directly into homeowner perceptions about the 
financial value of their home, their readiness to use it in case of need, ownership-
related  expenses,  and their  perceptions  about how parties  treat  them as home-
owners (or tenants). In this way, it would perhaps be possible to determine to what 
extent homeowner preferences are due to their finding rightist policies to be more 
in line with their orientations and to what extent they are due to them finding that 
right-wing  parties  treat  them  better  as  a  group.  Perhaps,  the  use  of  in-depth 
interviews  could  serve  as  a  complement  here.  It  could  perhaps  also  help 
understanding how house-prices influence left-right orientation via egotropy or 
market-friendliness, and it could thus help understanding the finding that home-
ownership relates to some issue preferences and not to others. 
5.2 Size of the Relationship: Lack of Reference 
Points
Compared  to  the  effect  associated  with income,  the  marginal  effect  of  home-
ownership  is noteworthy. On average, homeownership corresponds to an increase 
in yearly household income of more than 100,000 SEK. But the existence of an 
independent  relationship  between homeownership  and left-right  orientation  are 
more in focus than its magnitude.33 I prefer leaving the assessment about the size 
of the general relationship here. To say more, it would be preferable to have a 
33cf. Duch & Stevenson (2006), who link their research to the large literature on sociotropy and use 163 national  
surveys  to  find  that  one's  perception  of  the  national  economy has  a  median  marginal  effect  of  5% on the 
probability of voting for an incumbent party. They do not comment upon this size.
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large  set  of  reference  points  across  nations  over  time  (cf.  Esaiasson  et  al, 
2012:145ff). Since homeownership is relatively uncharted territory, comparisons 
to other countries cannot be made. This points to the need for studies concerning 
homeownership in different types of welfare states over time. Such studies could 
also  allow an  assessment  of  how the  importance  of  homeownership  differ  in 
settings  where  welfare  state  policies  are  more  or  less  universal  and generous. 
They could also show how the effects of high house-prices vary over institutional 
settings.  A  hypothesis  would  be  that  in  less  decommodifying  welfare  states, 
individual  assets  matter  more  (cf.  Stephens,  2003:1015).  It  would  also  be  of 
interest to compare the role of homeownership according to housing policies and 
the political  treatment  of tenure forms. Here,  one may hypothesize that home-
ownership plays a more politicized role in countries which unlike Sweden have 
outright social housing. 
5.3 Group-Specific Differences
Instead of discussing the size of the general relationship, it is more meaningful to 
discuss  how its  systematic  variations.  Considering  group-specific  relationships 
has yielded interesting insights. Methodologically,  this is clearly a strategy that 
could prove rewarding. While retirement is not associated with homeownership as 
theory would  suggest,  I  have  uncovered  class-group variations,  and variations 
according to party block preference. 
Broadly,  homeownership  seems  to  be  especially  relevant  for  left-right 
orientation among farmers and in some quite large groups of white collar workers. 
Of course, many in the latter groups do not live in declining economic areas. They 
rather  live  in  the  very  same  regions  where  homeownership  is  found  to  be 
associated  most  strongly with a  rightward move on the left-right  dimension.  I 
remind the reader that this rightward move is really a move toward the middle, but 
that this may entail less amenability to leftist policies. These groups, within these 
areas,  appear  to  drive the relationship.  Within  them,  homeownership  seems to 
influence,  and  weaken,  the  relationship  between  class-group  and  left-right 
orientation.  For homeowners  other leftist-oriented groups,  it  may be that these 
tend  to  own lower-valued  houses,  or  that  their  labor-market  position  in  some 
sense is firmer. 
When differing  according  to  block party preference,  these  relatively  leftist 
class groups are probably captured again, albeit in a more noisy manner. And the 
strategy is  slightly  sensitive  to  the  inclusion  of  the supporters  of  the  Swedish 
Democrats. Here, two more things should be noted. Firstly, if the strategy holds, it 
seems to suggest a ceiling effect among right-wing government party supporters. 
These are already to the right, and homeownership does not change this, even if I 
consider a regional differentiation according to prices.  To some extent,  a finer 
coding of the dependent variable could perhaps give insights into the validity of 
this finding. For opposition-party supporters it is different. Here, a ceiling effect is 
plausibly absent, and I do recover an albeit comparatively weak association with a 
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less  leftist  orientation.  A  regional  differentiation  strengthens  the  relationship, 
although  the  number  of  observations  is  comparatively  small.  Secondly,  the 
findings for left-wing party supporters rhyme badly with results that these should 
be  (relatively)  insensitive  to  their  economic  situation  (Karadja  et  al,  2014; 
Margalit, 2013; Ansell, 2014). Our different findings may be due to two things: I 
do not study individual-specific changes over time. Nor can I differentiate directly 
according to baseline ideology. Instead I proxy for it with party preferences. 
5.4 Party Preferences and Political Implications
Results regarding the more specific welfare state issues have been touched upon 
above,  but  what  about  party  preferences,  a  variable  of  more  immediate 
importance?  In Table 4.10, the association between homeownership and a more 
rightward  self-placement  in  the  left-right  dimension  is  reflected  in  party 
preferences.  These  preferences  are  accompanied  by  a  comparatively  strong 
marginal  effect  on  the  probability  of  preferring  a  government  coalition  party, 
especially  in  high-price areas.  As mentioned,  it  cannot  be concluded if  this  is 
because homeowners agree with the politics of these parties in general or if they 
find that these parties have better policies for them. This question relates to the 
supply  side  of  politics,  which  I  have  kept  within  parenthesis  since  the 
introduction. I end by raising this parenthesis.
Although I would argue that political decision-makers are more important for 
homeownership  rates  and welfare  state  spending,  the results  here indicate  that 
homeownership  may  very  well  be  one  (reinforcing)  link  in  the  negative 
correlation between these aggregates.  To empirically trace this  link in Sweden 
would require analyses over time, which is a fully realistic project. Such a project 
would clearly have to consider the supply side of politics, the political treatment 
of tenure forms and the different roles of homeownership given Swedish welfare 
state changes. The actual importance of homeowners as an electoral group (e.g. 
compared  to  political  decision  makers)  for  macro-level  outcomes  in  Sweden 
remains beyond the scope of this thesis, and data have not even allowed us to 
consider either actual voting or voting intention (although party preferences come 
close),  let  alone  government  responses  to  homeowner  preferences.  But  the 
potential  relevance  of  homeowners  to  the  political  landscape  merits  some 
reflections.
Even a  small  difference  may become more  important  for  aggregate  social 
preferences,  and policy,  if the group of homeowners increases (cf. Kitschelt  & 
Rehm, 2014). Recall that this proposition is consistent with what Ansell (2014) 
finds at  the cross-country level:  Rising prices affect policies more in countries 
with rates of ownership above the median of 62% (given that right-wing parties 
are in office). And remember that Sweden belongs to this category. Although it 
may be best to think of homeownership as being associated with a more middle 
orientation in some large leftist groups, I uncover comparatively strong marginal 
effects  on right-wing party preferences,  particularly in  major  city areas.  These 
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areas account for roughly a third of the electorate, and have problems of housing 
shortage which are the object of much political debate. This suggests a dimension 
to housing policy beyond considerations concerning social mobility, the possible 
benefits of private ownership, the importance of housing for economic growth, 
etc:  The current  leftist  Swedish government  may have an additional  cause for 
trying  to  moderate  house-prices  increases,  increasing  the  construction  rate  of 
rental apartments and assuring that these become a relevant choice for different 
social  groups.  (On  the  last  two  points,  EU  rules  may  imply  a  challenge; 
Bengtsson, 2013; Gruis & Priemus, 2008.)  
Furthermore, the difference in political orientation between homeowners and 
tenants may very well depend on house-price changes over time, which are also 
influenced by politics, both general economic policy and housing policy. Given 
the price increases,  political  decisions affecting the housing stock composition 
may really have contributed to the underlying displacement of the electorate that 
Oscarsson  &  Holmberg  (2013a)  register.  Such  a  displacement  could  be  an 
unintended  consequence  of  housing  policies  (cf.  Pierson,  2004:115ff),  but  it 
cannot be excluded a priori that Swedish parties, similar to British ones, have not 
had this effect in mind. To investigate these issues would require bringing in party 
politics, and relating differences in political orientation according to tenure form 
over time to housing stock changes. The time dimension would then allow some 
further exploration of how price changes influence the importance of tenure form 
for political orientation, and of how the relationship is sensitive to particular party 
campaigns and current debates as well as other welfare state policy changes.
A last  political  concern  brings  us  back to  group-specific  relationships  and 
party preferences. It is often argued that winning the votes of the middle class of 
the inner city of Stockholm is very important in national elections. As suggested 
above, the housing market in Stockholm may be special for several reasons. For 
instance,  the use of right-to-buy policies  and ownership-related  tax credits  are 
more common here. And prices are higher and rising more acutely, which allows 
for  a  more  speculative  view  on  housing.  But  housing  could  very  well  help 
explaining a general  comparatively rightist  baseline orientation here,  and well-
grounded  discursive  research  on  the  meaning  of  homeownership  inside  and 
outside Stockholm (or high-price areas), where both citizens and politicians are 
studied, can be rewarding. 
Of  course,  the  importance  of  investigating  the  political  meaning  of  the 
relationship  between  homeownership  and  left-right  orientation,  as  well  as  its 
significance in time and space, are based on the primary conclusion: in this thesis, 
I have unveiled a hitherto unnoticed consequence of housing policy outcomes, a 
relationship that helps structuring the political landscape in Sweden.
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Appendix 
Each dependent variable in Table 4.9 has five response alternatives: “very good 
proposal”,  “rather good proposal”, “neither good or bad proposal”,  “rather bad 
proposal”,  and  “very  bad  proposal”.  Certain  dependent  variables  are  recoded 
according to the text. 
Each  question  starts  with  the  words  “What  is  your  opinion  on  the  following 
proposal”.  Column  by  column,  the  continuation  is  worded  as  follows  (my 
translations): 
1. ”Reduce the size of the public sector”
2. ”Lower the taxes” 
3. ”Reduce the income differences in society”
4. ”Raise unemployment benefits”
5. ”Raise municipal and county taxes rather than cutting down on services”
6. ”Give more support to private schools”
7. ”Let private companies run eldercare”
8. ”Run a greater share of health care privately”
9. ”Prevent companies to run hospitals in order to make a profit”
10. ”Profit distribution should not be allowed in tax financed care, education and healthcare”
The data reference links to the codebook.
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